2022]
341
Notes and Comments
NOTES AND COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIVE FUNCTIONS OF MINORITY RIGHTS AND
SOCIAL JUSTICE IN INDIA
Abstract
While the constitutional idea of social justice hinges around the representation of
traditionally excluded castes, it makes an exception in case of minority educational
institutions. This paper attempts to demonstrate that the basket of minority rights
is quite empty to begin with. Such emptiness has been filled with the exclusion of
social justice policies. This empty-full basket constitutes religious identity as a valid
category for the construction of minority-majority bipartite. The whole subterfuge
plays out to perpetuate the hegemony of upper castes cutting across religious lines
which prevents the emergence of an egalitarian, liberal and fraternal Indian society
that the constitution seeks to facilitate. To make all these arguments, this paper
relies on post structural methods to look beyond the fixed, rigid categories employed
by the constitution and constitutional courts. Finally, this paper seeks to advance
certain conceptual tools to practice democratic constitutionalism in the Indian
context.
“It is the tyrants and bad rulers who are afraid of spread of education and knowledge
among the deprived classes.”
Justice B P Jeevan Reddy1
I Introduction
EVERY COLLECTIVE identity encapsulates its own relational and precarious
conditions of emergence. Collective forms of identification under compulsions of
mass mobilization always incorporate certain antagonism which is constitutive of all
societal possibilities.2 Articulation of majority and minority identities is a typical mode
of mobilizing the people along any system of difference among them. This system of
difference is reproduced and stabilized through an ensemble of social, cultural,
economic, political, and legal practices. Once the hegemony of a particular system of
difference is established through such practices, it starts speaking in terms of ‘natural
differences’. These natural differences begin to conceal specific power relations which
1
2
Unni Krishnan v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1993 SC 2178.
For a detailed conceptual detour of this line of thinking see, Ernesto Laclau, and Chantal
Mouffe, “Hegemony and socialist strategy: Towards a radical democratic politics.” Verso, London
(2014); Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox (Verso 2000); Ernesto Laclau, “On Populist
Reason”, (Verso, London 2005); Ernesto Laclau, “Why Constructing a People Is the Main
Task of Radical Politics” 32 (4) Critical Inquiry 646-680 (2006); Ernesto Laclau, “Emancipation(s)”
Verso, London (2007).
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Journal of the Indian Law Institute
[Vol. 64: 3
form the majority or minority identities acting as the constitutive outside for each
other. This process ensures the precarious stability of majority and minority identities
through an equivalential logic holding their components and operating on the basis of
constitutive difference with the outsider. Non-recognition and misrecognition of
relatively powerless groups subsumed by majority-minority identities and suppression
of their democratic demands by the dominant majority/minority discourse then
becomes a common legitimate phenomenon. An essentialist and rationalist approach
toward group identities consistently fails to comprehend the systemic exclusion, violence
and oppression ingrained in the formation of such identities. However, it is always
possible to deconstruct all those nodal points which provide stability to the system of
difference and subvert its claims of ‘naturalness’. Legal and constitutional practices as
nodal points carry special importance in the construction and sustenance of hegemonic
identities. Unraveling those nodal points to reveal and reconfigure particular power
relations instituted by any hegemonic discourse could open up multiple avenues for
the emancipation of the oppressed and redemption of the oppressor.
The construction of religious majority and minority categories in the Indian
subcontinent under the supervision of the British colonial state developed a range of
legal and constitutional practices which continue to inform contemporary socio-political
life.3 Inscription of religion on caste as the system of difference assigned a special role
to minority rights as an important nodal point of majority- minority architecture even
in the post-colonial setup. Built around article 30, the basket of minority right continues
to perform many vital functions for different hegemonic groups. To begin with, the
constitution offered an empty basket of minority rights on religious grounds which
has since been organized to preserve the interests of Ashraaf-Savarna castes.4 The
empty basket itself was the outcome of Ashraaf-Savarna anxieties generated by the
impending departure of the British Raj from the subcontinent. The succession battle
over the spoils of the British Raj between Ashraaf-Savarna represented by the Muslim
League and the Congress created a bloody legacy of partition. Residuary Ashraaf left
on this side of the border decided to preserve the minority category, howsoever desolate,
3
4
G. Aloysius, Nationalism without a Nation in India (Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1st edn.,
1998); Gail Omvedt, Understanding Caste: From Buddha to Ambedkar and Beyond (Orient
Blackswan, Delhi, 2011); Perry Anderson, The Indian Ideology, (Three Essay Collective, Gurgaon,
2nd edn., 2015); Khalid Anis Ansari, “Pluralism and the Post- Minority Condition: Reflections
on the Pasmanda Muslim Discourse in North India” in Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Bruno
Sena Martins et.al. (eds.), The Pluriverse of Human Rights: The Diversity of Struggles for Dignity 106127 (Routledge, 2021).
The term ‘Ashraaf ’ has been used in this paper to refer to upper castes who self-identify as
socially superior castes by birth using Islamic and Christian symbolism. The term ‘Savarna’ has
been used to refer to upper castes who self- identify as socially superior castes by birth using
Brahmanic symbolism. Jointly they have been referred to as ‘Ashraaf- Savarna’ or ‘Savarna Ashraaf ’
interchangeably depending on the need to emphasize the role of one or the other class.
2022]
Notes and Comments
343
which their Savarna counterparts were pleased to concede.5 Continued legitimization
of the category of religious minority through article 30 accompanied by all its imagery
and continuous jugglery over personal laws, ensured that the category of the religious
majority becomes constitutionally legitimate and politically resurgent. All attempts by
anti-caste democratic movements to build a socio-political majority of numerically
superior but historically disempowered castes in the form of Bahujan identity meet a
dead end in the face of communal polarization. While socio-cultural process6 in the
formation of Hindu-Muslim binary has been under rigorous academic scrutiny, it is
equally important to understand the post-constitutional mechanism through which
this binary is reproduced in an institutionalized way.
While the constitutional idea of social justice hinges around the representation of
traditionally excluded castes7 from all the institutions of national life, it makes an
exception in the case of minority educational institutions (MEIs). Religion and language
have been made the basis of article 30 overriding the determinative force of ‘caste as
an enclosed class’8 in the distribution of educational goods. Religious grounding of
article 30 then in turn is paraded to buttress the secular and progressive credentials of
the Constitution as a founding document.9 Judicial interpretation of article 30 further
cemented this argument firstly, by excluding caste as the axis of social justice in MEIs
and secondly, by triggering certain constitutional amendments which directly exclude
social justice policies from being applied in such institutions. Apart from this constitutive
exceptionalism, there is very little within the ambit of article 30 which is exclusively
available to religious minorities.
This paper attempts to demonstrate that the basket of minority rights constructed
around specific constitutional provisions is quite empty. Secondly, this emptiness has
been filled by excluding social justice policies from MEIs. Thirdly, the mere presence of
MEIs in existing form preserves certain symbols of religious identity as a legitimate
religious minority. Fourthly, the legitimacy of the religious minority is used to create the
legitimacy of the religious majority. Fifthly, this whole subterfuge perpetuates the
hegemony of Ashraaf-Savarna cutting across religious lines. Finally, the continued
5
6
7
8
9
Constituent Assembly Debates, V 350-374.
Supra note 3.
In constitutional vocabulary they are known as Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other
Backward Classes
B. R. Ambedkar, Castes in India: Their Mechanism, Genesis and Development, 1916 and Annihilation
of Caste, 1936, States and Minorities, 1947. Available at: Babasaheb Ambedkar: Writings and
Speeches, Vol 1 at 03-96, 383-449 (1st edn. Education Department, Govt. of Maharastra, 1979).
Upendra Baxi, “Outline of a ‘Theory of Practice’ of Indian Constitutionalism” in Rajeev
Bhargava, Politics and Ethics of the Indian Constitution 92-118 (Oxford University Press, 2009); H
M Seervai, Constitutional Law of India, (Universal Law Publishing, New Delhi, 4th edn.,
2014); M. P. Singh, “Celebrating Secularism and Minority Rights in Our Constitution” 17 Journal
of the National Human Rights Commission 61-87 (2017).
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Journal of the Indian Law Institute
[Vol. 64: 3
Ashraaf-Savarna hegemony prevents the emergence of a scientific, rational, and
egalitarian Indian civilization, which the Constitution seeks to facilitate. To make all
these arguments, this paper looks, in specific post-structural ways, beyond the fixed,
rigid categories employed by the Constitution and constitutional courts. In this process,
the paper draws upon social movements which have challenged ‘natural’ constitutional
categories on the strength of their lived experiences. Judgments of constitutional courts
have been used as textual evidence of the judicial role in providing stability to AshraafSavarna hegemony through segregative interventions.
II Constitutive minority rights and social justice provisions
Popular assumptions around article 30 and the hollowness of minority rights
Article 30 is the only express provision in the constitution which refers to religious
minorities and hence carries all the burden of minority rights. Article 30(1) provides
that all minorities, whether based on religion or language, shall have the right to establish
and administer educational institutions of their choice. It assumes that religion or
language forms the basis of minorities entitled to make a choice regarding the
establishment and administration of educational institutions. This paper is focused
on interrogating the assumptions around the existence of minorities based on religion
and their educational needs. The question to be asked is whether, under Indian
conditions, religion is the correct axis of social order on which article 30 right is
sought to be invoked. Another related question is to what extent religious identity
determines the access to educational opportunities for historically excluded classes
within the ambit of constitutional provisions.10
To answer these questions let us first refer to the constitutional provisions which deal
with the access to educational opportunities for different marginalized social groups.
Article 15(4) provides that the State shall make special provisions for the advancement
of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens including for the Scheduled
Castes (SC) and the Scheduled Tribes (ST). These special provisions have primarily
taken the form of reservation in educational institutions for three categories; Other
Backward Classes (OBC), SCs and STs. In all studies conducted to determine the
educational status of different groups, it has been found that the educational needs of
a group can be identified with reference to their caste and socio-economic status.11
Accordingly, none of these categories take into account the religious identity an
individual or class to ascertain the educational needs of that category except for the
10
11
Supra note 3.
Kaka Kalelkar Commission Report, 1955; Mandal Commission Report, 1980; Sachar Committee
Report, 2006; Rangnath Mishra Commission Report, 2007.
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Notes and Comments
345
SC category.12 The three categories, by and large, cover 85% population of the country,13
including the majority of every religious group whose educational needs are sought to
be fulfilled by article 30.
Anti-caste movement has long established that caste identity determines access to
material opportunities in India, especially educational opportunities.14 Re-distributive
and affirmative action policies of articles 15 and 16 have been premised on this reality.15
Similarly, most articles under Part XVI of the constitution providing special provisions
for certain classes take caste as their starting point.16 If caste is the axis of Indian
social and economic order and, therefore, Constitutional action, why then does article
30 elevate religion for the establishment and administration of any educational
institution? What constitutive functions are performed by unrealistic religious
assumptions of article 30 in a caste society? However, another widespread assumption
developed around article 30 needs careful attention before we answer this question.
In popular discourse, article 30 right is understood as a special concession available to
religious minorities exclusively but not to religious majorities.17 The charge of minority
appeasement is animated by this assumption. However, this assumption is as flimsical
12
13
14
15
16
17
The scheduled caste category is the only category that mischievously excludes certain castes
which profess Islamic and Christian faiths but their social and educational status is similar to the
castes included in the SC list. This violence was done by the communal Presidential Order of
1950 issued under art. 341. Para 3 of this communal order provides that no person who professes
a religion different from the Hindu, the Sikh or the Buddhist religion shall be deemed to be a
member of a SC. This communal bar assumes that Islam and Christianity magically wipe out
all traces of untouchability from those who embrace them.
Extrapolation from the 1931 caste census and Mandal Commission Report, 1980 conclusively
establish that SC, ST and OBC taken together reach close to 85% of the population. Various
studies point out that the OBC population alone is close to 52%. No wonder the ruling class
has been so shy of the caste census for nearly a century.
Jotirao Phule, “The Whipcord of the Cultivators”, 1883 translated by Gail Omvedt and Bharat
Patankar; Braj Ranjan Mani, Debrahmanising History (Manohar, New Delhi, 1st edn., 2005,); G.
Aloysius, “British created Hinduism and Brahmins created the myth that India is Bharat” 2
Prabuddha: Journal of Social Equality 1-16 (2018); Naren Bedide, “The Brahmin Keeps India in
the 18th Century’ 2 Prabuddha: Journal of Social Equality 26-33 (2018); Khalid Anis Ansari,
“Contesting Communalism(s): Preliminary Reflections on Pasmanda Muslim Narratives from
North India” 1 Prabuddha: Journal of Social Equality 78-104 (2018).
For the struggle of constitutional courts in understanding this reality see; Ayaz Ahmad, “Role
of Supreme Court in Arresting Social Democracy” in Salman Khurshid, Yogesh P Singh,
Lokendra Malik, et.al. (eds.), The Supreme Court and the Constitution: An Indian Discourse 182-205
(Wolters Kluwer, New Delhi, 2020).
See art. 330 to 342 A.
Art. 29 on the other hand despite its misleading marginal note titled “Protection of interests
of minorities” has always been understood to belong to both minorities and majorities. See,
The State of Bombay v. Bombay Education Society, AIR 1954 SC 561.
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as the first one. The supporters of article 30 passionately assert that under this article
alone religious minorities can impart religious instruction in educational institutions
in otherwise constitutionally mandated secular curriculum.18 However, these article 30
enthusiasts overlook the import of article 19(1)(g), article 26(a), article 28(2) and article
28(3) on the question of religious instruction that can be imparted in any educational
institution. Article 28(2) overrides the prohibition imposed by article 28(1) on religious
instruction in an educational institution administered by the State if such an institution
is established under any endowment or trust which requires that religious instruction
be imparted in such institution. In other words, the bar on religious instruction being
imparted in an educational institution can be circumvented by the simple device of
establishing that institution through endowment or trust. Incidentally, MEIs as
envisaged by article 30 too are generally established through educational endowment
or trust. Similarly, private educational institutions, both aided and unaided, can be
established through an educational endowment, trust or society by all citizens in exercise
of the right under article 19(1)(g) and article 26(a).19
Therefore, all citizens, irrespective of their religion, are entitled to establish educational
institutions both in public and the private sector in which they can secure a provision
for religious instruction. This point is further buttressed by article 28(3), which provides
that when an educational institution recognized by the State or receiving aid out of
State funds imparts religious instruction or conducts religious worship in such
institution or any premises attached to it, it has to get the consent of the person (or
guardian) attending such an educational institution. This provision envisages that
religious instruction or religious worship can be provided in educational institutions
recognized by the State or receiving aid out of State funds; only the participation has
been made contingent upon consent.20 Thus, the possibility of imparting religious
instruction or conducting religious worship is neither an exclusive preserve of MEIs
nor dependent on the existence or non-existence of article 30. In any case, since the
minority status of a religious or linguistic community is to be ascertained with reference
to the State in which MEIs are established and administered, every religious and linguistic
community finds itself clothed with minority status in one or the other State to invoke
article 30. Thus, every religious and linguistic community, irrespective of its numerical
strength at the national level, can be considered a minority in relation to article 30
18
19
20
Supra note 9.
Unni Krishnan v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1993 SC 2178; T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of
Karnataka, AIR 2003 SC 355; Islamic Academy of Education v. State of Karnataka, AIR 2003 SC
3724; P. A. Inamdar v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2005 SC 3226.
See the opinion of Ruma Pal J., in T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka, AIR 2003 SC 355.
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Notes and Comments
347
rights in appropriate cases.21 Therefore, it is utterly misleading to assert that article 30
“has nothing to do with the majority community”.22
Once it is acknowledged that article 30 does not offer anything exclusive to the socalled religious minorities, a curiosity to understand the performative functions of
MEIs is inaugurated. A critical survey of judicial opinion in the following few sections
would reveal that ‘exclusion’ of social justice has been the most consistent attribute of
article 30.23 Denial of reservation in admissions and appointments to Pasmanda
Bahujan24 communities in MEIs is the bedrock of judicial underpinning of this article.
Under our constitutional scheme, social justice policies in educational institutions are
primarily carried out under articles 15(4) and 16(4). None of these articles provide
that social justice policies will steer clear of MEIs in their application. Nor does article
30 hint towards any such course. It is the Supreme Court’s interpretive derive that
managed to insinuate MEIs from the democratizing influence of articles 15(4) and
16(4), so much so that such an exclusion eventually got inscribed under articles 15(5)
and15(6) of the Constitution. How the Supreme Court achieved this feat forms the
bulk of case law analysis in the following sections. However, why did the Supreme
Court adopt an anti- social justice approach vis-a-vis article 30? Answering these questions
is key to understanding the constitutive functions of minority rights in our peculiar
socio-legal and political landscape.
Supreme Court opinion on Kerala Education Bill: Laying the foundation
The question whether the social justice mandate of articles 15 and 16 extends to MEIs
was referred by the President to a constitutional bench In Re The Kerala Education Bill 25
case. Chief Justice SR Das who authored the majority opinion found those parts of
the Kerala Education Bill 1957 to be ‘objectionable’ and ‘perilously near violating the right’
under article 30 which required educational institutions to give representation to SCs,
STs and the Backward Classes in the appointment of school teachers through state
public service commission.26 He wrote that the “teachers belonging to reserved categories may
21
22
23
24
25
26
This position is judicially established through a long line of cases beginning with In Re The
Kerala Education Bill 1957 AIR 1958 SC 95; D. A. V. College v. State of Punjab, Jullundur, AIR 1971
SC 1737; The Ahmedabad St. Xaviers College v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1974 SC 1389; T.M.A.Pai
Foundation v. State of Karnataka, AIR 2003 SC 355.
Justice M. H. Dwivedi in The Ahmedabad St. Xaviers College v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1974 SC 1389.
Sujit Chaudhry, Madhav Khosla, et.al. (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Indian Constitution 947
(Oxford University Press, New York 1st edn., 2016).
Sujit Chaudhry, Madhav Khosla, et.al. (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Indian Constitution 947
(Oxford University Press, New York 1st edn., 2016).
1957 AIR 1958 SC 956.
Kerala Education Bill, Cl. 11 of the bill specifically provided that in selecting candidates, the
Commission was to give regard to the provisions made by the government under clause (4) of
Art. 16 of the Constitution. That is to say, give representation in the educational service to
persons belonging to the Scheduled Castes or Tribes, a provision severely criticized by the
counsel appearing for the Anglo-Indian and Muslim communities.
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Journal of the Indian Law Institute
[Vol. 64: 3
have no knowledge of the tenets of minority religion and may be otherwise weak educationally”.27
However, the majority reluctantly upheld the provisions relating to the implementation
of article 16(4) government directive as permissible regulations. The majority opinion
concluded that the provision of the Kerala Education Bill, which sought to restrain
government and private schools from charging tuition fees in the primary classes,
offended article 30(1). The court reasoned that the imposition of such restriction
against the collection of fees from any pupil in the primary classes would make it
impossible for MEIs to be carried on. This reference opinion undermined two essential
facets of social justice in the Kerala Education Bill concerning article 30. First,
representation of SCs, STs and the OBCs in MEIs and second, free and compulsory
education to all children aged six to fourteen years as mandated by unamended article
45.28
The first assertion by the constitutional bench that the teachers belonging to Backward
Classes lack knowledge of minority religion and happen to be educationally weak and
that a provision for their reservation in MEIs makes ‘serious inroads on the right of
administration’, betrays the caste prejudice of Ashraaf-Savarna judges. There is no
evidence to support such a claim.29 Such claims only promote the development of
anti-social justice epistemology and delegitimize the democratic demands of backward
castes in all institutions of common public life.30 The second assertion that restriction
against the collection of fees would make MEIs impossible too had a very weak empirical
foundation. It preempted the development of a common education system which
could be one of the most effective social justice tools in a society plagued by graded
inequality.3131 Free education for all the students in the primary classes was a tentative
step towards a common education system. Its subversion in the name of minority
rights secures an exclusive access to elite educational institutions for upper castes
irrespective of minority-majority status. From here on, the shield of minority rights,
in combination with similar other devices,32 was used to derail all efforts towards
achieving a common education system.
27
28
29
30
31
32
Kerala Education Bill, Cl. 11 of the bill specifically provided that in selecting candidates, the
Commission was to give regard to the provisions made by the government under clause (4) of
Art. 16 of the Constitution. That is to say, give representation in the educational service to
persons belonging to the Scheduled Castes or Tribes, a provision severely criticized by the
counsel appearing for the Anglo-Indian and Muslim communities.
The substance of art. 45 now stands transferred to art. 21A by the Constitution (Eighty-sixth
Amendment) Act, 2002, s. 2 (w.e.f. 1-4-2010).
Sukhdeo Thorat and Katherine Newman, eds., Blocked by Caste: Economic Discrimination in Modern
India (Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2010).
Subsequent judgments on the issue stand testimony to this epistemic violence.
Supra note 8.
For instance, the rights of private players under art. 19(1)(g) have been invoked to install
privatized education system, which adds multiple layers of hierarchy, almost mirroring the
hierarchy of caste society.
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Notes and Comments
349
In many ways, the Supreme Court opinion on Kerala Education Bill laid the foundation
for insulating MEIs from social justice policies. It paved the way for using article 30 as
a weapon against affirmative action measures under articles 15 and 16. Building on the
reasoning of Kerala Education Bill, J C Shah J., in Rev Sidhajbhai Sabhai v. State of Bombay33
held that insofar government orders relate to reservation of seats for the school board
teachers in MEIs, they infringe fundamental freedom guaranteed under article 30.
However, it was equally possible to save the reservation order by restricting the scope
of reservation in MEIs to the OBCs belonging to the concerned minority community
based on Kerala Education Bill reasoning, both to “protect the backward classes” and leave
some space for the “sprinkling of outsiders”. If this had happened, the jurisprudence on
article 30 vis-a-vis articles 15 and 16 would have evolved in a much more democratic
direction. Instead, what was reluctantly tolerated by the court in Kerala Education Bill
became intolerable in Rev. Sidhajbhai on the basis of reasoning advanced in the former!
Such intolerance of the Supreme Court towards social justice policies is not confined
to minority educational institutions alone. This pattern cuts across the range of
affirmative action initiatives envisaged by the Constitution.34 Nevertheless, it must be
noted that Rev. Sidhajbhai case was not at all concerned with the applicability of article
16(4) in MEIs. This issue was still governed by the hesitant ratio of Kerala Education
Bill.
In Rev. Sidhajbhai, Shah J., also laid down a dual test to decide the constitutionality of
regulations sought to be applied to MEIs. First, the test of reasonableness, and second,
that it is conducive to making the institution an effective vehicle of education for the
minority community while retaining its character as a minority institution. This in
reality was a single test because a regulation could be held reasonable only if it satisfied
the second test first. However, this test does not help in deciding when a regulation is
conducive to the minority community or when it would destroy the minority character
of the institution. Even if these tests were to be applied to regulations giving effect to
social justice policies, they could still not be held to be unconstitutional. But Rev.
Sidhajbhai decision did precisely this.
Right to appoint the Staff: A license to exclude bahujan class
Rev. Sidhajbhai ratio effectively precluded Pasmanda Bahujan students from invoking
article 15(4) to secure admission in MEIs. Ground for nullifying article 16(4) was
prepared by Hidayatullah J., in Rev. Father W. Proost v. The State of Bihar35 whereby he
recognized the unqualified right to appoint the staff members for Article 30 institutions
by upholding the constitutional validity of section 48-B of the Bihar State Universities
Act, 1960. This Act exempted MEIs from common appointment procedure through
33
34
35
AIR 1963 SC 540.
Supra note 15.
1969 AIR SC 465.
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Journal of the Indian Law Institute
[Vol. 64: 3
University Service Commission. If the appointment of staff in MEIs was made by a
common appointment procedure then the question of complying with article 16(4)
while making appointments could emerge easily. However, once the right to appoint
the staff members in article 30 institutions legally fell in the hands of upper caste/
upper-class management or administrators of MEIs, the question of giving effect to
article 16(4) became stillborn. Following Father Proost in D. A. V. College v. State of
Punjab,36 P. Jaganmohan Reddy J., held that the statutory provision laying down that
the staff of affiliated minority colleges be appointed with the approval of the University
Vice Chancellor was violative of article 30. Consistent judicial exceptionalism in favor
of MEIs forced some state legislatures to incorporate article 30 exclusions in their
laws on educational institutions. For instance, the Bihar High Schools (Control and
Regulation of Administration) Act 13 of 1960 subjected the rule making power under
it to articles 29, 30 and 337. As a result, when the rules were framed under the Act by
the State Government of Bihar, they specifically excluded schools established and
administered by the minorities, whether based on religion or language from its
application. In Rt. Rev. Bishop S. K. Patro v. State of Bihar37 such an exclusion was so
naturalized that the Supreme Court invalidated the order of educational authorities
requiring the Secretary of the Church Missionary Society Higher Secondary School to
constitute a managing committee because it was in violation of the exclusion rule. The
question of constitutional representation in the management or administration of
MEIs could not emerge at all. For similar reasons, in State of Kerala v. Very Rev. Mother
Provincial 38 where the regulation and composition of managing and administrative
bodies was directly in issue, the question of implementing article 16(4) was never
raised. It was not considered even when the court considered the right to select the
teachers in MEIs. Further, attempts to regulate non-minority private institutions too
fell off the ground as any provision held inapplicable to minority institutions could
not be enforced against the majority institutions. Mother Provincial followed the trajectory
of Kerala Education Bill in making the ideal of a common education system much more
difficult than it always was.
Judicially established exceptionalism of minority rights under article 30
It has been noted above that nothing under article 30 is exclusively available to the socalled religious and linguistic minorities. articles 19(1)(g), article 28(2) and article 28(3)
read together confer same rights on every citizen and group of citizens which can be
exercised by religious and linguistic minorities under article 30. Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court established the exceptionalism of minority rights under article 30 in
the face of this reality. Traces of this construction are visible from Kerala Education Bill
36
37
38
1971 AIR SC 1737.
1970 AIR SC 259.
1970 AIR SC 2079.
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Notes and Comments
351
onward. However, this was most explicitly argued by Ray CJ., in The Ahmedabad St.
Xaviers College v. State of Gujarat39 where he observed that “the scope of Article 30 rests on
linguistic or religious minorities and no other section of citizens of India has such a right .” In the
same case, Justice Khanna observed that “The majority in a system of adult franchise hardly
needs any protection. It can look after itself and protect its interests. Any measure wanted by the
majority can without much difficulty be brought on the statute book because the majority can get that
done by giving such a mandate to the elected representatives. It is only the minorities who need protection,
and article 30, besides some other articles, is intended to afford and guarantee that protection.” 40 In
a similar vein, Justice S Mohan in his concurring opinion in Unni Krishnan v. State of
Andhra Pradesh41 observed that, “By implication also a fundamental right of the nature and
character conferred under Article 30 cannot be read into Article 19(1)(g). The conferment of such a
right on the minorities in a positive way under Article 30 negatise the assumption of a fundamental
right in this behalf in every citizen of the country.” These observations assume that there
already exists a preeminent religious majority which should make certain exceptions
for another fully constituted religious minorities. The constitutional and judicial role
in constructing the religious majority is quickly effaced by the concern for the religious
minorities and the need for exceptional provisions for them. One may ask what purpose
is served in establishing such exceptionalism about article 30 when it contains nothing
more than the exclusion of social justice policies. If anything, the exceptionalism of
MEIs concerning social justice has been used to sneak away social justice from private
educational institutions as well.42
Reaffirming Kerala Education Bill, Rev. Sidhajbhai, Father Proost, D. A. V. College, S. K.
Patro, Mother Provincial, the 9 judges bench in St. Xaviers College by majority held that
certain provisions of the Gujarat University Act, 1949 as amended in 1972 which,
among other things, contemplated supervisory role for the university in the appointment
as well as service conditions of teachers and in the composition of management/
administration in all colleges including minority colleges could not have any compulsory
application to minority institutions. If the government affiliating universities were
allowed a supervisory role in appointing the faculty and in the composition of
management/administration in MEIs, then at some point, reservation policy had to
be implemented in MEIs as affiliating universities are bound by it. Further, the tendency
to invoke article 30 so as to derail any movement towards common education system
continued in St. Xaviers College as well. Mathew J., made following observation against
the common education system in the garb of protecting minority rights: “there can be no
surrender of constitutional protection, of the right of minorities to popular will masquerading as the
39
40
41
42
1974 AIR SC 1389.
Ibid.
1993 AIR SC 2178.
This point has been elaborated in succeeding sections with reference to relevant judgments and
legal provisions.
352
Journal of the Indian Law Institute
[Vol. 64: 3
common ‘pattern of education.”43 A rare moment in acknowledgment of the relationship
between article 15(4) and article 30 is to be found in the partly assenting and partly
dissenting opinion of Dwivedi J., where he observed that the former places certain
express limitation on the right contained in later. He found that the right of admission
under article 30 is curtailed by article 15(4), which provides an exception to article
29(2).44 However, Dwivedi J., did not develop any consequential order based on this
finding.
Privileging conditions of service over people in service
Analysis of legislations reviewed by the high courts and Supreme Court from Kerala
Education Bill, Rev. Sidhajbhai, Father Proost, D. A. V. College, S. K. Patro, Mother Provincial
to St. Xaviers College reveals that except for Kerala Education Bill, none of them seem to
be concerned much about the social class of people who join in the services of
educational institutions. However, they remain obsessed with regulating their conditions
of service. As a result, the judicial forum was spared theburden to pronounce upon
the inclusion/exclusion of people in service of MEIs more directly. On one lone
occasion in Kerala Education Bill, the Supreme Court reluctantly tolerated the inclusion
provision. Nevertheless, in Rev. Sidhajbhai, where inclusion provision only indirectly
related to the admission of Pasmanda Bahujan, was struck down. However, the
cumulative effect of these two judgments on the Parliament and state legislatures was
mischievously profound. After these judgments, no government attempted to implement
social justice policies in MEIs. Such deference to judicial verdicts by the legislature and
executive, which limit the scope of social justice, cannot be understood without an
inquiry into the nature of the Indian state and society itself. Anti-caste democratic
scholars, through historical, social, cultural, economic and political studies, have
established that what emerged after the departure of the British from India was a
Brahmanic state of a particular kind. This Indian state is living testimony of Brahmin45
Savarna hegemony. Over time it mutated from socialist to capitalist to neo-liberal, yet
at its core, it remains a Brahmanic state.46 All its institutions, including its civil society,
are knitted with an ‘inter-institutional caste grid’ which delivers ‘singularity of
performance’ in the service of the Brahmin Savarna caste/class. Holding it all together
is the discourse that constructs Brahmin Savarna as ‘hindu majority’ and Sayed47 Ashraaf
43
44
45
46
47
The Ahmedabad St. Xaviers College v. State of Gujarat 1974, AIR SC 1389.
These findings were quoted with approval in T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka, AIR
2003 SC 355 by S N Variava J.
Brahmin is the highest caste in the caste order, like the Sayed caste.
Aakar Patel, “When will the Brahmin-Bania hegemony end?” Livemint, Aug 28 2009, available
at: https://bit.ly/3oKmGGV (Last visited on Dec. 20, 2022); Braj Ranjan Mani,
“Neobrahmanism, Human Rights and Social Democracy”, Roundtableindia.co.in, Feb. 1, 2012,
available at: https://bit.ly/34DG1T9 (last visited on Dec. 22, 20222).
Sayed is the highest caste in the caste order, like the Brahmin caste.
2022]
Notes and Comments
353
as ‘muslim minority’.48 This majority-minority dialectic carried with reference to religious
symbolisms conceals the miserable numerical inferiority of Ashraaf Savarna castes
and the privileges they derive from such a discourse at the cost of Pasmanda Bahujan.
That is why the Ashraaf Savarna class keeps all public and private spaces including
legislative, executive and judicial preoccupied with issues, fights and debates which
revolve around hindu-muslim, majority-minority axis. Reproduction of such fights
and debates preclude democratic issues especially those which relate to the
representation of Pasmanda Bahujan from emerging even as a contention. Privileging
conditions of service over people in service by the legislature or executive typically
leads to legal battles and debates which are more appropriately termed as ‘hegemonizing
fights and debates’.49 Through such hegemonizing fights and debates over relatively
irrelevant issues, the hegemonic class seeks to perpetually suspend all deliberation on
issues that concern the subjugated class.
This pattern continued after Ahmedabad St. Xaviers College as well. Following Ahmedabad
St. Xaviers College, in Lilly Kurian v. Sr. Lewina50 ordinance framed under the Kerala
University Act, 1969, which conferred appellate powers on the Vice Chancellor of
affiliating University concerning service conditions of staff was made inapplicable on
MEIs by Justice A P Sen. In All Saints High School, Hyderabad v. Government of Andhra
Pradesh51 now the Andhra Pradesh State Legislature passed a law to regulate the service
conditions of teachers in private educational institutions. Most of these provisions
were held to be violative of article 30 by the majority led by Chief Justice Chandrachud,
just as they were struck down in the earlier judgments. Similarly, in Frank Anthony
Public School v. Union of India,52 Parliament passed a law to regulate, among other things,
the service conditions of teachers in the Union Territory of Delhi. Only this time,
section 12 of the Delhi School Education Act 1973 which made the provision relating
to the service conditions of employees inapplicable to unaided minority institutions,
was found to be discriminatory and void by O Chinnappa Reddy J., as he thought that
defects found in earlier cases had been cured by the impugned provisions before him.
Another hegemonizing legal battle involving MEIs often concerns itself with the
minority status of an educational institution. The issue in such battles is framed on the
48
49
50
51
52
The Christian minority too is constructed for similar purposes but owing to smaller numbers,
its salience in supporting the construction of the hindu majority remains confined to small
pockets only. The Muslim minority project, on the other hand, has been scaled up to larger
territories across India. Hence its national salience.
Ayaz Ahmad “Judicial Hand in the Governmental Control Over Media” published in an edited
book titled “ Institutional Decline during Neo-liberal Regime: Notes from India”, in Yogesh P Singh,
Afroz Alam, (eds.) 138-158 (Thomson Reuters, New Delhi 2022).
AIR 1979 SC 52.
AIR 1980 SC 1042.
AIR 1987 SC 311.
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Journal of the Indian Law Institute
[Vol. 64: 3
following trope: the right to administer under article 30 must be preceded by the
proof of establishment of the institution by the minority community. For instance, in
S. Azeez Basha v. Union of India,53 Wanchoo J., took great pain to bring out the meaning
of word ‘establish’ only to depart from the path established by the previous judgments
of the Supreme Court on the subject. He held that the Aligarh Muslim University was
brought into existence by the Central Legislature and the Government of India.
Therefore, the Muslim minority could not claim to administer it under article 30.54
Although this judgment did not change anything on the ground, it did manage to
completely obscure the issue of Pasmanda Bahujan representation in Aligarh Muslim
University, which continues to be dominated byAshraaf-Savarana.55 In St. Stephen’s
College v. The University of Delhi56 too, this issue was labored at a great length by the
majority opinion. Again, the inter-institutional caste grid operated in such a way that
the question of representation of Pasmanda Bahujan in MEIs could not be raised in
any of these cases. Successfully keeping the issue of social justice out of MEIs despite
the engagement of multiple institutions from different geographies in a different context
is nothing but a singularity of performance in action. These cases reproduced
hegemonizing legal fights and debates for Ashraaf-Savarna in judicial forums, which
successfully kept out the issues and concerns of Pasmanda Bahujan.
50% Ashraaf and 50% Savarna in MEIs
The representation question in MEIs, for the first time, became a direct issue in St.
Stephen’s College v. The University of Delhi,57 where the directives of the university to
admit students through a uniform admission process and not to give preference to
students belonging to the minority community was challenged. However, the question
was resolved by the majority of judges led by K. Jagannatha Shetty J., in such a manner
that 50% of seats in MEIs got reserved for minority students, which established
them. The other 50% got reserved for students other than the minority community.58
53
54
55
56
57
58
AIR 1968 SC 662.
For the fallacy of this reasoning, see Ayaz Ahmad, “Judgment on the Minority Character of
AMU: A Classical Case of Fallacious Legal Reasoning”, Livelaw.in on Jan. 20, 2016. Available at:
https://bit.ly/3MYM2e4 (last visited on Dec. 10, 2022).
Tosib Alam and Surinder Kumar, “Social and Economic Status of Backward Muslims in Uttar
Pradesh: Need for An Inclusive Policy” 49:1 Social Change 90 (2019). Hussain Anis Khan, “
How Inclusive and Diverse is Jamia Millia Islamia?” The Wire, April 14, 2019. Esha Roy, “Why
NCPCR has recommended minority schools be brought under RTE” The Indian Express, Aug.
12, 2021.
AIR 1992 SC 1630.
AIR 1992 SC 1630.
The discovery of the magic number 50% on this occasion, like other occasions by the judiciary,
has no relation to the population size of the concerned groups, whether counted based on
religion or caste.
2022]
Notes and Comments
355
In the absence of any scheme for SC, ST and OBC students in MEIs, it practically
meant that 50% of seats would go to the Ashraaf students hailing from the so-called
minority communities, and 50% of seats would go to the Savarna students owning to
their accumulated educational and cultural capital. The majority judgment treated this
case as a virgin territory on the reservation of seats in MEIs, ignoring that in the Kerala
Education Bill case, the Supreme Court had reluctantly upheld the provision of
reservation for SC, ST and OBCs in the context of article 16(4). St. Stephen’s College was
an occasion where the Supreme Court could firm up the hesitant ratio of the Kerala
Education Bill in the context of articles 15(4) and 16(4). More so when it had reached
the court after the implementation of Mandal Commission Report,59 which had
conclusively established that all religious groups are divided on caste lines and lower
caste exclusion from educational resources is common to all of them. Nevertheless,
after paying flowery tributes to minority rights and social justice, the majority judgment
laid down a 50-50 formula at the cost of Pasmanda Bahujan cutting across the minoritymajority construct. After Kerala Education Bill, MEIs were administered on the implicit
understanding that they were free to prefer students, teachers and other staff from
their community. Shetty J, in this context, observed that the advisory opinion in the
Kerala Education Bill case recognized a fair degree of discrimination in favor of religious
minorities. Right after this, he quoted Justice Gajendragadkar from M. R. Balaji v. State
of Mysore,60 where he pointed out that “the reservation to socially and educationally backward
classes would serve the interests of the society at large by promoting the advancement of the weaker
elements in the society”. Shetty J even quoted Justice Ray from State of Kerala v. N.M.
Thomas,61 where in the context of articles 14, 15 and 16, he observed that “preferential
treatment for members of the backward classes alone can mean equality of opportunity for all citizens”.
Yet Shetty J failed to extend this logic to MEIs while laying down his 50-50 formula in
favor of Ashraaf Savarna.
Even the dissenting opinion of M Kasliwal J, in St. Stephen’s College elided the question
of Pasmanda Bahujan representation. Kasliwal J, in his dissent, demonstrated full
awareness of the scope and applicability of article 15(4) in MEIs. He expressly held
that “the right of admission is further curtailed by Article 15(4) which provides an exception to
Article 29(2). Article 15(4) enables the State to make any special provision for any advancement of
any socially and educationally backward class citizens or for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
Tribes in the matter of admission in the educational institutions maintained by the State or receiving
aid from the State.” However, he too refused to apply his logic to the case before him
and held that MEIs are not entitled to claim any preferential right or reservation in
59
60
61
Report of the Backward Classes Commission, 1980. Available at: http://www.ncbc.nic.in/
User_Panel/UserView.aspx? TypeID=1161 (last visited on Dec. 20, 2022).
AIR 1963 SC 649.
AIR 1976 SC 490.
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Journal of the Indian Law Institute
[Vol. 64: 3
favor of backward class students.62 His conclusion effectively meant that 100% of
seats in MEIs should remain open to Savarna Ashraaf; otherwise, article 29(2) would
be violated. This conclusion is strikingly similar to the Supreme Court position in the
State of Madras v. Champakam Dorairajan,63 articulated 40 years before St. Stephen’s College!
Neoliberal churning and the Mohini Jain-Unni Krishnan trigger
Adoption of the New Economic Policy in 1991 under expanding neoliberal world
order championed by the global elite ushered in a tectonic shift in the way Indian
economy and society were organized. It led to churning in the field of education as
well. 64 The proliferation of private educational institutions meant that the question
of social justice in such institutions acquired greater importance. Moreover, partial
implementation of the Mandal Commission Report and its qualified judicial approval6565
in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India 66 ensured that the issues of accessibility and
representation in private and public educational institutions find some expression in
judicial forums. The issue of accessibility on economic grounds in private educational
institutions was taken up first in Mohini Jain v. State of Karnataka.67 After proclaiming
education to be a fundamental right under Part III of the Constitution,68 Justice Kuldeep
Singh observed that “the capitation fee brings to the fore a clear class bias. It enables the rich to
take admission whereas the poor has to withdraw due to financial inability.” He went on to strike
down those parts of the notification issued under the Karnataka Educational
Institutions (Prohibition of Capitation Fee) Act, 1984, which permitted higher fees to
be charged to students (not including foreign and NRI students) from outside
Karnataka. Incidentally, this Act contained a scheme of “Government Seats” in private
educational institutions whereby reservations for SC, ST and OBCs could be specified
and fees fixed by the government. However, a spate of petitions filed by private
educational institutions, including MEIs engaged in medical and engineering education,
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
A decade later, the dissenting opinion of Justice Sayed S M Quadri in T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State
of Karnataka, AIR 2003 SC 355 treaded on a similar trajectory
AIR 1951 SC 226.
Henry A. Giroux, Neoliberal Savagery and the Assault on Higher Education as a Democratic
Public Sphere in “The Idea of the University” (Issue 29) of Café Dissensus on Sept. 15, 2016.
Available at: https://bit.ly/3i2V7om. (last visited on Dec. 20, 2022).
Supra note 15.
(1992) Supp 2 SCR 454 (SC).
AIR 1992 SC 1858.
The Supreme Court could have very well proclaimed that privatization of education is in
violation of the golden triangle sketched by it poetically through Art. 14, 19 and 21, which
could obviate the need for proclaiming education as a fundamental right altogether. Of course,
that would have made impossible much of the analysis done in this paper of the judicial and
constitutional developments post Mohini Jain judgment.
2022]
Notes and Comments
357
challenged the correctness of Mohini Jain’s decision and such schemes of some southern
states in Unni Krishnan.69
The entry of MEIs in Unni Krishnan case triggered a series of judicial and legislative
interventions which used MEIs as the constitutive outside to organize private
educational space into an exclusive preserve of the upper castes/class. Although Unni
Krishnan limited the general proclamation of Mohini Jain about the fundamental right
to education only for children up to the age of 14 years, it significantly strengthened
the scope of social justice in private educational institutions, including MEIs. B P
Jeevan Reddy J., evolved a scheme of 50% ‘free seats’ and 50% ‘payment seats’ for
private, professional colleges. Under this scheme, 50% of ‘free seats were to be filled
by the government nominees, and remaining 50% of payment seats were to be filled
by those candidates who were prepared to pay the full fee. Students for both types of
seats were to be selected through a common entrance exam based on their inter se
merit. Reservation of seats for constitutionally permissible classes could be made on
both types of seats with the approval of the affiliating University. Moreover, the fee
chargeable in each professional college was subjected to the ceiling prescribed by the
appropriate authority or by a competent court. Every state government was directed
to constitute a committee to fix the ceiling on the fees chargeable by professional
colleges. Every authority granting recognition/affiliation was mandated to implement
this scheme in the institutions seeking recognition/affiliation from it. In fact, the said
scheme was held to constitute a condition of such recognition or affiliation in addition
to the extent terms and conditions.
It is to be noted that Unni Krishnan premised this scheme on articles 14 and 15 along,
with the relevant legislations of Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, Karnataka and Tamil
Nadu, in addition to the preambular promise of justice social, economic and political.
Mohini Jain and Unni Krishnan judgments on capitation fees, free seats, allotment of
seats through common entrance exams and reservation schemes in private educational
institutions could exert democratizing influence on them. Under such an influence,
private educational institutions could evolve as a partly shared space70 with diverse
social classes in their formative stages. Unni Krishnan and Mohini Jain made valiant
attempts to neutralize the growing inegalitarian effects of neoliberalism and Savarna
Ashraaf dominance in privatized education. Of course, none of this valor would have
been necessary if the Supreme Court could muster sufficient courage to hold
privatization of education as unconstitutional encroachment of articles 14, 19 and 21
in the first place. However, as the subsequent judicial efforts too were grounded in the
constitutional ideal of a fraternal and egalitarian society, sabotaging them directly was
69
70
Supra note 1.
Partly shared because 50% of payment seats could still be claimed predominantly by AshraafSavarna castes only.
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[Vol. 64: 3
difficult for Ashraaf Savarna strategists. Hence, the bogey of MEIs was summoned to
confront the Mohini Jain- Unni Krishnan ratio. The critical components of this ratio,
capitation fee, free seats, allotment of seats through common entrance exams and
reservation scheme, were framed as a transgression of the rights of MEIs. True, Unni
Krishnan consciously refrained from making any order or direction about MEIs, and a
few matters relating to them were delinked to be heard separately.71 But it was insufficient
to prevent MEIs from playing their constitutive role conceived by judicial minds.
Several state governments insisted that MEIs too follow the Unni Krishnan scheme;
MEIs intuitively claimed that being MEIs, they were exempt from any such scheme,
the issue landed in the Supreme Court, and the familiar story followed. The Supreme
Court, in its interim order,72 modified the Unni Krishnan scheme in favor of MEIs to
the extent that 50% of seats could be filled up by candidates selected by the state
government based on a competitive test with the fee as determined by the government
for this class of students. The remaining 50% of seats could be filled by candidates
selected by MEIs belonging to a particular religious or linguistic minority. MEIs were
exempted from the common entrance test (CET) as well, they were free to devise their
own admission test. This order was later approved73 with the modification that out of
the 50% of seats to be filled by the government, half will be payment seats, and half
will be free seats. Similarly, out of the 50% of the seats to be filled by the MEIs, half
will be payment seats, and the other half will be free seats. Consequent to such
exemptions and modifications in the Unni Krishnan scheme concerning MEIs, the whole
issue of equal access to privatized education got transformed into a dispute about the
scope of article 30 and MEIs74! Such a transformation is evident in how questions
were framed for subsequent determination from T. M. A. Pai up to P A Inamdar
judgments.
T.M.A. Pai onslaught against the spirit of Unni Krishnan using MEIs
Once certain exemptions from the Unni Krishnan scheme were granted to MEIs and its
sanctity breached, the tag of MEI became a convenient escape route from the
democratic influence of the Unni Krishnan scheme. A large number of private educational
institutions falsely started claiming to be MEIs only to gain the advantage of 50%
71
72
73
74
Shahal H. Musaliar v. State of Kerala, Writ Petition (civil) 598 of 1993, order dated Aug. 18, 1993.
Islamic Academy of Education v. State of Karnataka, Writ Petition (Civil) 350 of 1993; S. Venkatesha
Education Society v. State of Karnataka, Writ Petition (Civil) No. and 355 of 1993, order dated May
14, 1993.
T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka, AIR 1994 SC 2372.
Such a transformation was noted by Virendra Kumar differently. However, he could not articulate
the constitutive role of MEIs in this transformation primarily because he sought to defend the
Unni Krishnan scheme by invoking art. 29(2) at the cost of art.15(4) and 16(4). See Virendra
Kumar, “Minorities’ Right to Run Educational Institutions: “T.M.A. Pai Foundation” in
Perspective” 45 Journal of Indian Law Institute 200 (2003).
2022]
Notes and Comments
359
admissions on their own.75 For the same reason, a demand for uniform treatment of
all professional colleges – minority or otherwise - in the matter of admissions started
gaining traction before courts. The Supreme Court’s interim response by a three judges
bench which included Kuldeep Singh J., and B P Jeevan Reddy J., was to increase the
NRI quota, to increase the fee structure of ‘free seats’ by renaming it as ‘merit seats’,
to suggest subvention and loan schemes and finally, to leave the substantial questions
concerning the implementation of the Unni Krishnan scheme as questions of MEIs to
be reconsidered/modified by a larger bench.76
The reconsideration by a larger bench in T. M. A. Pai77 concluded with the scraping of
the Unni Krishnan scheme, inter alia, on the ground that it violated the rights of MEIs
under article 30. Unable to trace any sound constitutional basis for the
‘unreasonableness’ of the Unni Krishnan scheme, all the counsels for private educational
institutions as well as the Solicitor General of India urged in unison that the scheme
violated the rights of MEIs. Once Unni Krishnan scheme was held to be unconstitutional
vis-a-vis MEIs, all that other private educational institutions had to plead was parity
with MEIs in order to avoid the said democratic scheme. One ground on which the
Unni Krishnan scheme was declared unreasonable by the majority judges in T. M. A. Pai
led by Chief Justice B N Kirpal was that paradoxically some students who came from
private schools and who belonged to more affluent families were able to secure higher
positions in the merit list of the common entrance test, and were thus able to seek
admission to the “free seats”.78 If one is to go by this argument and conclusion, the
effect of scraping the Unni Krishnan scheme was going to be 100% capture of seats by
students coming from rich and affluent backgrounds! Such effect could easily be offset
by the constitutional policy of reservation for Pasmanda Bahujan on both free and
payment seats which, was integral to the Unni Krishnan scheme. State governments
never implemented this part of the scheme resulting in the anomaly noted above
which, gave an excuse to the T. M. A. Pai majority judges to scrap the scheme altogether.
The T. M. A. Pai court, instead of prodding state governments on their failure, was
more anxious to consider the impact of this scheme on MEIs and the merit and effect
of article 30. In this way, the infanticidal fate of the Unni Krishnan scheme was sealed
through MEIs to a great extent.
The common entrance test, another important aspect of the Unni Krishnan scheme
intended to check the arbitrary practices of private educational institutions in the
75
76
77
78
T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka, AIR 1995 SC 2431.
Ibid.
T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka, AIR 2003 SC 355.
A similar fate awaits all affirmative schemes in India which conceive social justice on class or
religious grounds, ignoring the determinative role of caste in access to educational and economic
goods. This judgment tacitly acknowledges that all merit is constructed through access to social,
educational, and financial resources.
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Journal of the Indian Law Institute
[Vol. 64: 3
matter of admissions, was shot down in T. M. A. Pai by invoking St. Stephen’s College79
ruling, which upheld the right of MEIs to have an admission procedure of its own.
Similarly, the matter of deciding fee structure, the constitution of a governing body,
and the appointment of teachers and staff in private unaided non-minority educational
Institutions were brought at par with MEIs by T. M. A. Pai judgment. Even the
disciplinary control over teachers and staff was left to the mercy of the management
of private institutions, just like MEIs. The reasoning offered by B N Kirpal J., for
this feat is ominously reminiscent of the reasoning in MEI judgments analyzed above.
The predilection of MEIs in T. M. A. Pai series of orders and judgments was
fundamentally to determine the impact of Unni Krishnan scheme on them. With the
invalidation of the Unni Krishnan scheme one would expect there was very little left to
be determined with respect to MEIs. But after bringing parity between MEIs and
private educational institutions so as to insulate both from the democratic spirit of
Unni Krishnan scheme, T. M. A. Pai judgment went on to devote large number of pages
on the nature and scope of article 30 rights. Discussion from the previously settled
question of the unit for the purpose of determining a “minority”, to the extent of the
rights of aided and unaided MEIs, to the interplay of articles 29 and 30 was extensively
made to hold that any regulation framed in the national interest must necessarily apply
to all educational institutions, whether run by the majority or the minority. What would
constitute ‘national interest’ with reference to a given regulation for MEIs was left to
speculation by future benches.80 For instance, whether a regulation to give effect to the
constitutional provision for reservation in MEIs would be in the national interest was
not clarified. With nothing left to be determined with respect to MEIs, B N Kirpal J.,
made pointless proclamations about secularism and equality being part of the basic
features of the Constitution and article 30 preserving secularism in the country. In
one ironical paragraph, the autonomy of private unaided institutions in the method
of recruitment and disciplinary procedure for teachers/staff, charging of fees, and
admission procedure secured by importing MEI jurisprudence into private unaided
institutions was sought to be extended back to unaided MEIs! There were a few minor
additions to MEI jurisprudence by T. M. A. Pai majority judgment, though. The 50-50
formula of St. Stephen’s College was made flexible depending upon the level of the
institution and the population and educational needs of the area in which the institution
was located. With this qualification percentage of the non-minority students to be
admitted to MEIs was left to be notified by the concerned state government. There
was a meek observation that the state authorities could insist on allocating a certain
79
80
AIR 1992 SC 1630.
On this point, both the assenting opinion of Justice B N Kirpal and the dissenting opinion of
Justice Sayed S M Quadri was answering hypothetical questions because, after the demise of
the Unni Krishnan scheme in the earlier parts of T .M. A. Pai judgment, there was no regulation
(neither in national interest nor in the interest of MEIs) which could be imposed on MEIs.
2022]
Notes and Comments
361
percentage of seats to SC, ST, and OBC groups, from amongst the non-minority seats
in aided MEIs. For the minority seats, even such a meek suggestion was unthinkable.
In fact, V N Khare J., in his concurring opinion, observed that the “...word ‘caste’ is
unheard of in religious minority communities”. How could he then think of Pasmanda
representation in MEIs who, for him, were non-existent?81 Similarly, Sayed S M Quadri
J., and Ruma Pal J., in their partly assenting and partly dissenting opinions, invoked the
concept of ‘equality in fact’ to argue for the preferential rights for minorities in MEIs
but could not think it necessary to support the equality in fact for Pasmanda Bahujan.
Ironically, they did so by referring to articles 15 and 16, which guarantee equality, in
fact, for Pasmanda Bahujan in all institutions of national life! S N Variava J., too while
open to giving preference to physically handicapped or dependents of employees in
MEIs, remained oblivious of the need for such preference to Pasmanda Bahujan.
However, while building his argument for the applicability of article 15(1), 28(2), 28(3),
and 29(2) on article 30, he quoted with approval the finding of Dwivedi J., in St.
Xaviers College that article 15(4) places an express limitation on article 30 right. But
Variava J., much like Dwivedi J., too failed to draw any consequential order in favor of
Pasmanda Bahujan.
Interpreting the interpretation from Islamic Academy to P A Inamdar
Contemporary social scientists, especially the practitioners of discourse theory, stand
firmly against the possibility of uncontested final determination of any meaning,
whether in language or society.82 This approach proceeds by taking into account the
subjectivity of the interpreter/reader and how it is shaped by a complex interplay of
power, contingency, and identification. It implies that the meaning of words and texts
can only be partially fixed, and the possibility of an alternative signification can never
be hermetically sealed.83 Radical implications of these developments in linguistic, social,
and political fields are yet to be worked out fully to comprehend Indian legal theory
and practice.
V.N. Khare J., in Islamic Academy of Education v. State of Karnataka,84 speaking for the
constitutional bench, constituted to interpret the interpretation of T. M. A. Pai
judgment, started by noting that various state governments, different high courts and
educational institutions understood that judgment differently. However, the democratic
81
82
83
84
On this point, both the assenting opinion of B N Kirpal J., and the dissenting opinion of
Sayed S M Quadri J., was answering hypothetical questions because, after the demise of the
Unni Krishnan scheme in the earlier parts of T .M. A. Pai judgment, there was no regulation
(neither in national interest nor in the interest of MEIs) which could be imposed on MEIs.
David Howarth, Discourse, (Rawat Publications, New Delhi, 2019); David Howarth, Jason Glynos
and Steven Griggs, “Discourse, explanation and critique” 10:1 Critical Policy Studies 99-104 (2016).
Ibid.
AIR 2003 SC 3724. Also see Modern School v. Union of India (2004) 5 SCC 583.
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[Vol. 64: 3
impulse of V.N. Khare J., and the majority for which he wrote the Islamic Academy
opinion could not completely square up with the inegalitarian thrust of T. M. A. Pai
judgment. Khare J., after acknowledging two contradictory principles of T. M. A. Pai
i) that each institute must have the freedom to fix its fee structure ii) that there can be
no profiteering and capitation fees cannot be charged, held that the respective state
governments shall set up, in each state, a fee committee. This committee was directed
to decide whether the fee proposed by educational institutions was justified. The
committee was at liberty to approve the fee structure or propose another fee the
institute could charge. Charging any other amount not approved by the committee
would amount to charging of capitation fee, which could be duly penalized by the
appropriate authorities.On the question whether minority and non-minority educational
institutions stand on the same footing and have the same rights under the T. M. A. Pai
judgment, the majority of Islamic Academy held that the minorities are given a special
right under article 30, which gives them certain advantages Such advantages as per
Islamic Academy include, firstly, exemption from future laws that might be enacted to
nationalize education or to take over the management of educational institutions.85
This hypothetical advantage was immediately qualified by asserting that a minority
institute can be closed down in national interest. Secondly, MEIs have a preferential
right to admit students of their community/language, which is not available to nonminority educational institutions. The operational reality of this second advantage has
been brought out in the analysis of St. Stephen’s 50-50 formula in favor of Ashraaf
Savarna.
On the question of the right of private unaided professional colleges to admit students
and the method of their admission Khare J., held that in non-minority professional
colleges, admission of students, other than the percentage given to the management,
can only be based on merit as per the common entrance tests conducted by government
agencies. The same questions for professional MEIs were answered similarly with a
rider that they can admit students of their community/language in preference to a
student of another community in their management quota. The admission to
management quota seats could be made either based on the common entrance tests
conducted by the State or on the basis of CET to be conducted by an association of
all colleges of a particular type in that State, e.g., medical, engineering or technical.
Once again, while the preferential right of MEIs to admit students of their community/
language was recognized, the exclusion of Pasmanda Bahujan remained unrecognized.
In the end, the majority opinion of the Islamic Academy directed respective state
governments to appoint a permanent committee to oversee the common entrance
tests and permit an institution that had been permitted to follow its admission procedure
for the last 25 years. The seats to be filled by the management and state governments
were fixed in the ratio of 50:50 as an interim arrangement. However, the committee
85
S B Sinha J., dissented from this hypothetical proposition.
2022]
Notes and Comments
363
could permit the admission of students from minority community in MEIs over the
quota allotted to them by the state government if it was felt necessary.
Through its hermeneutic technique, the majority judgment of the Islamic Academy
managed to restore some traces of democratic spirit ushered by the Unni Krishnan
scheme lost to the 11 judges bench of T. M. A. Pai. However, zero progress on the
democratic claims of Pasmanda Bahujan in MEIs, even, in this case, underlines their
constitutive role in perpetuating Ashraaf-Savarna hegemony. Partly assenting and partly
dissenting opinion of S. B. Sinha J., expressed this constitutive function in following
words, “It would be constitutionally immoral to perpetuate inequality among majority people of the
country in the guise of protecting the constitutional rights of minorities and constitutional rights of
backward and downtrodden”. Despite this clear expression, Sinha J., clubbed minority and
backward category together to give the impression that some kind of majority exists
minus the former two category people. Further, as per Sinha J, this mythical majority
of people suffer from inequality when in reality, it is the backward and downtrodden
people who are in the majority by all estimates.86 By referring to religious minority
alongside backward and downtrodden he manages to present Savarna Ashraaf as
majority and their minority rule as the rule of majority. In this vein, Justice Sinha
opined that article 15 (4) and 16 (4) cannot be applied on article 19(1)(g) or article 30
educational institutions. Here the reference to article 30 MEIs appears only as a shield
for the Savarna- Ashraaf owned article 19(1)(g) educational institutions against
constitutional vision of social justice.
All such assenting, dissenting and, concurring opinions came together in P. A. Inamdar
v. State of Maharashtra,87 where seven judges bench of the Supreme Court sat to
reinterpret the interpretation of the T. M. A. Pai judgment as interpreted by Islamic
Academy. The counsel88 for so-called minority and non-minority educational institutions
vehemently assailed the Islamic Academy judgment for going beyond T. M. A. Pai in
violation of article 19(1)(g) and article 30. The strongest words of disapprobation
were reserved for the reservation policy in favor of SCs, STs, and OBCs in unaided
minority and non-minority educational institutions. On behalf of the respondent
States it was categorically submitted that “if the scheme as evolved in Islamic Academy of
setting up of permanent Committees is not allowed, education which is already commercialized to
some extent would be wholly inaccessible to students coming from middle classes, lower-middle classes
and poor sections of the society”. However, for P. A. Inamdar, reassessing the relationship
between articles 29 and 30 was more convenient. After reaffirming their repeatedly
affirmed relationship, R.C. Lahoti J., brought up the ‘sprinkling’ of a minority from
other states on the same footing as a sprinkling of non-minority students. On the rest
86
87
88
Supra note 13.
AIR 2005 SC 3226.
Most of these counsels are from the upper caste; almost all are from the upper class.
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of MEI issues, the opinion in Kerala Education Bill was reiterated. The separate opinion
of S. B. Sinha J., found special favor in P. A. Inamdar for the reasons noted above.
Judicially constructed artificial distinction between professional and non-professional
education institutions was used by P. A. Inamdar to hold that the States have no power
to insist on seat sharing in the unaided private professional educational institutions by
fixing a quota of seats between the management and the State, nor does it have any
power to implement the reservation policy. Reservation of seats in such institutions
was held not in minority interest within article 30(1) or a reasonable restriction within
article 19(6) of the Constitution. The bubble of merit that O. Chinnappa Reddy J., so
completely busted in K.C. Vasanth Kumar v. State of Karnataka89 was inflated again by
Lahoti J., to support his pronouncement. In the name of merit,90 the scheme of
management seats and state government seats evolved by the Islamic Academy was
overruled. However, P. A. Inamdar found no merit issues with the NRI quota and
legitimized it to 15%! MEIs were granted a free hand to admit students of their own
choice, including non-minority community students and members of their community
from other States, to a limited extent, without giving effect to the representational
mandate of article 15(4). However, common entrance test for admission was held not
to cause any dent in the right of MEIs as they could exercise their choice from the list
of successful candidates prepared at the CET. For non-minority institutions, too,
CET was made permissible. Determination of the fee structure was left to the sweet
will of both minority and non- minority institutions. However, regulation of fees was
made permissible on the ‘impossible to determine ground’ of preventing profiteering.
Finally, the two committees of the Islamic Academy for monitoring admission procedure
and determining fee structure were held to be permissive regulatory measures in the
interest of minorities and the student community as a whole. They were held not to
violate the right of minorities under article 30(1) or the right of minorities and nonminorities under article 19(1)(g). However, these committees were made temporary
until the Central Government or the state governments could devise a suitable
mechanism and be subjected to judicial review.
It is to be noted that all key questions framed by P. A. Inamdar concerning reservation
policy, admission procedure, determination of fee structure, and the two committees
of Islamic Academy were first answered with reference to MEIs and article 30. These
answers were then easily extended to non- minority private educational institutions as
well. Thus, the organization of a private educational space as an exclusive Savarna
Ashraaf abode was achieved using the constitutive force of MEIs.
89
90
(1985) SCR Supl. (1) 352.
For a contemporary account of merit and its hegemonic deployment see, Michael J. Sandel,
The Tyranny of Merit, (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New York 2020).
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Notes and Comments
365
From judiciary to Parliament: Constitutionalizing the exceptional
Deconstruction of judicial discourse on MEIs visibilizes following two facets associated
with it; i) MEIs are used as the constitutive outside to organize Savarna Ashraaf interests
in the field of education, and for this purpose, ii) the specificity of MEIs is maintained
by the exclusion of social justice policies from them. But the direct expression of
these facets in P. A. Inamdar outraged democratic forces, which the Parliament could
not ignore. However, as an essential limb of the inter-institutional caste grid, the
Parliament responded in a way that preserved the constitutive force of MEIs and
secured the Savarna Ashraaf interests simultaneously. The Parliament inserted clause
(5) in article 15 by the Constitution 93rd Amendment Act, 2005, which provided that
nothing in article 15 or in sub-clause (g) of clause (1) of article 19 shall prevent the
State from making any special provision, by law, for the advancement of any socially
and educationally OBCs of citizens or for the SCs or the STs in so far as such special
provisions relate to their admission to educational institutions including private
educational institutions, whether aided or unaided by the State, other than the minority
educational institutions referred to in clause (1) of article 30. Three things come out of this
amendment; one, that the representation of Bahujan Pasmanda in non-minority private
educational institutions became dependent on the sweet will of the State;91 second,
their representation in MEIs went out of the constitutional purview. Third, by
restricting the special provision only to admissions, the question of reservation in
appointments in private educational institutions was closed, which was open till P. A.
Inamdar. In other words, what was systematically constructed as exceptional by the
Supreme Court became constitutional with this amendment.
Following the lead provided by the 93rd Constitutional Amendment Act, the Central
Educational Institutions (Reservation in Admission) Act, 2006 (CEI Act)9292 aimed to
secure Pasmanda Bahujan representation in Central Educational Institutions, too
excluded MEIs from the ambit of reservation.93 Section 4 of the CEI Act, which
legislated such exclusion side by side, also excluded two more areas of judicially
constructed anti-social justice zones;94 i) institutions of excellence, research institutions,
institutions of national and strategic importance as specified in the Schedule to this
91
92
93
94
For the tragic consequences of such an arrangement in higher education, see Yogesh Pratap
Singh and Ayaz Ahmad, “Privatization of Higher Education in India: Constitutional Vision,
Emerging Issues and Trends” 7 RGNUL Law Review 1-20 (2017).
(No. 5 of 2007).
For another legislation that enacted the exclusion of reservation from MEIs and its routine
acceptance by a division bench of the Supreme Court see Indian Medical Association v. Union of
India (2011) 7 SCC 179.
These areas of judicially constructed anti-social justice zones are variously termed as ‘technical
posts’, post involving ‘specialties and super-specialties’, ‘posts at the higher echelons’ and ‘superspecialties courses’. See supra note 14.
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Act, ii) a course or program at high levels of specialization, including at the postdoctoral level, within any branch or study or faculty, which the Central Government
could specify. This section provides clear legislative
evidence about the constitutive usage of MEIs in legally safeguarding Savarna Ashraaf
interests; by insulating MEIs from social justice policies the Parliament also insulated
judicially constructed anti- social justice zones. Now judicially constructed anti-social
justice zones could easily be protected under the high ideal of protecting the minority
rights.
Nevertheless, the validity of the 93rd Amendment Act, 2005 and CEI Act, 2006 was
challenged in Ashoka Kumar Thakur v. State of Bihar.95 The majority, led by Chief Justice
K. G. Balakrishnan, held that 93rd Amendment Act does not violate the basic structure
doctrine so far as it relates to the admission of SC, ST, and OBC students in aided
educational institutions. This principle, in any case, was already covered by article 15(4).
However, as such aided institutions include MEIs also, the exclusionary part of article
15(5) was validated vis-a-vis MEIs on the ground that it only gave effect to the mandate
of article 30.96 By now, we know that article 30 gives no such mandate which warrants
exclusion of article 15(4) or 16(4) from article 30 institutions. Such an exclusionary
mandate has been judicially thrust upon MEIs for the hegemonic purposes of Ashraaf
Savarna. Dalveer Bhandari J., in his partly assenting and partly dissenting opinion,
openly felt that the exemption of MEIs from reservation elevates their status to a
certain extent as it liberates more institutions from the caste-based reservation! In his
opinion, while caste-based reservation divides the nation, religion-based educational
institutions unite it. It carries the faith that religion-based MEIs of Sayed Ashraaf
help Brahmin Savarna to unite the caste-divided population into religious majority
and minority groups. Such a faith was decisive in judging the constitutional validity of
the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 (RTE Act 2009).
The RTE Act mandated that every recognized school, imparting elementary education
even if it was an unaided school, admit in Class I, to the extent of at least 25% of the
strength of that class, children of the age 6 to 14 years belonging to the weaker sections
and provide free and compulsory education till its completion. Chief Justice S. H.
Kapadia, Justice Swatanter Kumar, and K.S. Radhakrishnan J., in Society for Unaided
Private Schools of Rajasthan v. Union of India97 unanimously held that those provisions of
95
96
(2008) 6 SCC 1 (SC).
By necessary implication, the constitutional validity of s. 4 of Central Educational Institutions
Act, 2006 vis-a-vis MEIs too was upheld. This obviated the need to review the other two types
of anti-social justice zones covered by s. 4 of the CEI Act, 2006. These exclusions were not
even framed as an adjudicatory issue. The constitutive function of MEIs in safeguarding Savarna
Asharaaf interests was also in full play on this occasion.
2022]
Notes and Comments
367
the RTE Act 2009, which extend it to unaided minority schools infringe the fundamental
rights guaranteed under article 30(1) of the Constitution. Therefore they shall not
apply to such unaided minority schools.98 Article 15(5) now provides a perfect
constitutional basis for this exceptional conclusion. Once again, the Parliament got its
cue to legalize the exceptionalism of MEIs constructed by judicial interpretation. It
amended the RTE Act in 2012, expressly subjecting it to article 30, meaning that
MEIs will not provide free and compulsory education to 25% of students belonging
to socially disadvantaged groups.99
The validity of those parts of article 15(5), which concern admission in private unaided
educational institutions, was directly considered by a constitutional bench of the
Supreme Court in Pramati Educational and Cultural Trust v. Union of India.100 While A. K.
Patnaik J., writing for the unanimous court, found reservation provision for unaided
non-minority institutions to be an element of their charitable character, for unaided
MEIs same provision was found to pose a threat to their minority character under
article 30(1). Inclusion of unaided non-minority institutions within reservation policy
was considered to be in furtherance of the preambular promise of equal opportunity
hence consistent with the basic structure of the Constitution.101 Exclusion of MEIs
from reservation policy was also considered to be in furtherance of the preambular
promise of equal opportunity, which too was found to be consistent with the same
basic structure.102 The exclusion was deemed necessary by the unanimous court even
when the RTE Act 2009 made suitable provision for the reimbursement of expenditure
incurred by the MEIs in imparting free education to 25% of students from socially
and financially weak backgrounds. In addition, Patnaik J., wrote that excluding Pasmanda
Bahujan from admissions in MEIs maintains the secular character of India as well.
97
98
(2012) 6 SCC 102.
K.S. Radhakrishnan J., in his dissenting opinion, clubbed unaided minority and non-minority
institutions to insulate both from the social justice provisions of the RTE Act 2009. The same
strategy on the question of social justice was followed in T. M. A. Pai and P. A. Inamdar, which was
partially disapproved by the 93rd Constitutional Amendment. The majority opinion in Society for
Unaided Private Schools was in perfect harmony with art. 15(5), which preserved the specificity
of MEIs by excluding social justice from them and, therefore, retained their constitutive character.
99 The definition of weaker section and disadvantaged group under the RTE Act 2009 includes
Pasmanda Bahujan.
100 (2014) 8 SCC 1.
101 The validity of art. 15(5) was already upheld by a division bench led by J B.Sudershan Reddy in
Indian Medical Association v. Union of India (2011) 7 SCC 179. Curiously, Pramati does not refer to
this judgment at all, which made forceful arguments in support of reservation and the mandate
of art. 15(5).
102 The basic structure doctrine, a product of judicial hermeneutics, suffers from the same interplay
of subjectivity, power, contingency, and identification of the members of the legal fraternity
who gave birth to it. The rhetoric of protecting minority rights was used in good measure to
articulate this suspect doctrine. See Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 1461.
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This approach betrays the exclusionary nature of Indian secularism and indicates its
unique contribution to perpetuating Savarna Ashraaf hegemony.103 The court overruled
even that part of Society for Unaided Private Schools, which had allowed the RTE Act 2009
to remain applicable to aided minority schools. In what way the presence of a few
Pasmanda Bahujan students in Class I could trample the special character of MEIs?
What power could such kids exert on MEIs to force them out of oblivion? There is
no way to reconcile with this judgment unless one acknowledges the constitutive
functions of MEIs in serving Savarna Ashraaf interests.104
Constitutionalizing judicially constructed exceptionalism of MEIs vis-a-vis social justice
policies reached its zenith with the Constitution (One Hundred and Third Amendment)
Act, 2019, which added article 15(6). This dubious amendment of the Constitution
aimed at further cementing Savarna Ashraaf entitlements by providing them 10 %
reservation, grants routine exemption to MEIs from its application.105 What makes
this exemption even more revealing is that it was made by the so- called anti-minority
party even when the amendment was assured of full Parliamentary support.106
Evolving a constitutional strategy for associated mode of living
Educational institution is a place where democratic ethos can be inculcated among
youthful minds. An educational institution’s ability to house students and staff together,
cutting across social identities, makes it the most promising space for the development
of fraternal spirit. This potential of educational institutions in creating fraternity among
students and faculty leading to greater social affinity, can be realized only when it is
organized with the presence of diverse social classes in them. Judicial intervention in
making articles 15(4) and 16(4) inapplicable on MEIs in the garb of protecting article
30 minority rights outcasts this potential. Therefore, developing constitutional strategies
to reorganize present educational space as a shared place for associated living is a
foremost democratic task of our time. Taking into account extant constitutional, legal,
and judicial positionality, the following strategies are tentatively suggested to create a
democratic opening in present and future educational spaces:
103 For a comprehensive investigation into the nature and character of Indian secularism, see
Prakash Chandra Upadhyaya, “The Politics of Indian Secularism, 26(4) Modern Asian Studies
815-853 (1992); Perry Anderson, The Indian Ideology, (Three Essay Collective, Gurgaon, 2nd
edn., 2015).
104 After the Pramati judgment, the exceptional began to be treated as ‘normal’ in legislative and
judicial consideration of any issue concerning educational institutions, including MEIs. See
Modern Dental College and Research Center v. State of MP (AIR) 2016 SC 2601.
105 See, Ayaz Ahmad and Yogesh Pratap Singh, “Crumbling Social Justice and the Need for Representative
Higher Judiciary”, in Kuffir Nalgundwar et.al. (eds.), EWS: The Quota to End All Quotas (Shared
Mirror, Hyderabad, 2021).
106 It was National Democratic Alliance (NDA) led by Bhartiya Janta Party (BJP), which passed
the 103rd Constitutional Amendment. BJP is widely perceived as a communal party due to its
frequent invocation of religious symbolism.
2022]
Notes and Comments
369
Firstly, Providing reservation to Pasmanda Bahujan, who hail from the respective
religious or linguistic group that has set up MEIs, is entirely consistent with existing
judicial logic that regulatory provisions aimed at improving the quality of MEIs are
not violative of article 30. This can be done without externalizing the process of
appointment and admission in MEIs, which is a nonnegotiable judicial dictate to date.107
The reasoning, in this case, is aligned to the extant judicial position that; “the regulatory
clauses improve the administration and do not inhibit its autonomy and are therefore good
and valid”;108 that it will only make MEIs “an effective vehicle of education for the minority
community or other persons who resort to it”;109 that it would be “a permissible regulation which in
no way ‘detracts from the fundamental right guaranteed by Art. 30(1)”;110 that it is meant for the
“excellence of education and efficient administration of MEIs”111 as the provision for Pasmanda
Bahujan representation remains within the minority communities. This representation
scheme for Pasmanda Bahujan in MEIs is least likely to face resistance from judicial
corners or minority right enthusiasts.
Providing reservation to all Pasmanda Bahujan irrespective of religious or linguistic
affiliation in MEIs. Article 29(2) has been consistently held to apply to article 30(1)
right in a harmonious way. When article 29(2) is made applicable to article 30(1), then
article 15(4), as the constitutionally carved out exception to article 29(2), is equally
applicable to article 30(1). In other words, wherever article 29(2) goes, articles 15(4)
and 16(4) follow it. This consequential interpretation was unjustly plugged by the
Constitutional 93rd Amendment Act of 2005 concerning admissions to MEIs. Be that
as it may, a scheme providing representation to all Pasmanda Bahujan in MEIs
irrespective of religious or linguistic affiliation under article 15(4) and 16(4) will liberate
the judicial mind from wrestling between article 29(2) and article 30(1) as the
prohibitions of article 29(2) would be wholly addressed by such a representation.
Implementation of reservation policy in MEIs will not impair the substance of article
30 right in a significant way. It will not result even in an incidental encroachment upon
the right to administer. Providing reservations to SC, ST, and OBCs in MEIs might
precipitate the removal of the religious barrier from the SC category as not giving
reservations to Dalit Muslims and Dalit Christians in Muslim/Christian MEIs would
become visible as glaring injustice on the religious ground alone. Moreover, expanding
the OBC category to make it proportionate to their population might also become
inevitable. If Dalit Muslims and Dalit Christians are not absorbed in the SC category,
107 Gandhi Faizeam College v. University of Agra, AIR 1975 SC 1821.
108 Ibid.
109 See Rev Sidhajbhai Sabhai v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1963 SC 540; The Ahmedabad St. Xaviers College
v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1974 SC 1389.
110 Frank Anthony Public School v. Union of India, AIR 1987 SC311.
111 T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka, AIR 2003 SC 355.
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their continuance in the OBC category would require an increase to 50% of OBC
quota.
However, this representation scheme for Pasmanda Bahujan across religions in MEIs
will make them indistinguishable from general educational institutions except perhaps
for the managerial control, which would remain predominantly with the Sayed Ashraaf
class. It then brings us to the ideal solution to the problem analyzed in this paper.
Repealing Article 30 and providing reservation to all Pasmanda Bahujan communities
in all educational institutions, whether public or private, by sub-categorizing similarly
placed castes with reference to their socio-educational status. Removing religion-based
educational institutions from the constitution will make it difficult for Savarna Ashraaf
groups to configure it as a communal space guarding caste hierarchies. In private
educational institutions, the scheme of free seats combined with a system of
representation for Pasmanda Bahujan can incrementally realize the democratic ideal
of the common education system. It is through a common education system alone
that a society fractured along caste and communal lines can fructify into a nation of
coequal citizens.
III Conclusion
Hegemonic practices produce certain social myths and collective imaginaries to preserve
socially constructed political identities, which are always constituted with the inclusion
and exclusion of a select class of people.112 One such myth is that social justice should
remain out of bounds from MEIs. The judicial spunk in trying to protect this notion
as being in the interest of minorities is a similar imaginary. Continuous reconstruction
of religious majority and religious minority is inherent in the ringing tone of Supreme
Court judgments on MEIs. Thus, the apparent large hardheartedness of the interinstitutional caste grid concerning article 30 disguises the constitutive function of
minority rights. The exclusion of social justice from MEIs is the logical extension of
this constitutive logic. Apart from preserving communal identities, there is very little
that article 30 does to fulfill the educational needs of those who require educational
support. It is a constitutional device to permanently fix the boundaries of religion and
maintain the minority-majority categories to protect the interests of Savarna Ashraaf
castes across religions.113
At one stage, the constitutive force of MEIs thwarted experiments with the common
education system and organized private educational institutions as exclusive Savarna
Ashraaf den at another. The crux of the matter is that article 30, in its present form,
erases the possibility of an educational space that Pasmanda Bahujan could share with
112 Supra note 81.
113 Nidhin Donald, “Religion as ‘unsettled’: Notes from Census and Anti-Caste Mobilizations”, 1
Prabuddha: Journal of Social Equality 68-77 (2018).
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Notes and Comments
371
Ashraaf Savarna to launch a decisive attack against everyday caste and communal
practices. By erasing the fraternal space for associated living, the hollow of minority
rights constitutes and perpetrates Savarna Ashraaf hegemony. That is why the judicial
questfor a balance between article 30 and articles 15(4) and 16(4) of the constitution
keeps tilting in favor of Savarna Ashraaf, driven by the overwhelming upper caste/
class social location of senior advocates and judges in the higher judiciary. In the
perpetuation of Savarna Ashraaf hegemony, constitutional, legal, and judicial practices
concerning MEIs play a crucial role. Therefore, the dis-articulation of Savarna Ashraaf
hegemony in social, economic, and political domains will remain incomplete unless
hegemonic constitutional, legal, and judicial practices are rethought.
The human and civilizational cost of Savarna Ashraaf hegemony is unfathomable.
Stubborn refusal to provide reservation to Pasmanda Bahujan in MEIs has resulted in
the disproportionate presence of Savarna Ashraaf in these institutions in the name
of ‘sprinkling of outsiders.’114 Disproportionate representation of upper castes in
educational institutions, whether general or minority, has subverted the democratic
potential of all institutions, including the higher judiciary. While the maintenance of
religiously informed majority-minority discourse does allow Ashraaf Savarna to edge
out the democratic claims of Pasmanda Bahujan, it has a debilitating effect on their
creative potential. Ashraaf Savarna, under perpetual dread of each other and anxiety
of Pasmanda Bahujan, morally and intellectually cripple themselves.115 In this context,
following poignant observation of Justice B. Sudershan Reddy remains as relevant as
ever:116
It would appear that we have now entered a strange terrain of twilight
constitutionalism, wherein constitutionally mandated goals of
egalitarianism and social justice are set aside, the State is eviscerated of
its powers to effectuate social transformation, even though inequality is
endemic and human suffering is widely extant particularly amongst
traditionally deprived segments of the population, and yet private
educational institutions can form their own exclusive communes for the
imparting of knowledge to youngsters, and exclude all others, despite
the recognized historical truth that it is such rules of exclusion have
undermined our national capacity in the past.
114 Supra note 54.
115 Gopal Guru, “Constitutional Justice: Positional and Cultural” in Rajeev Bhargava, Politics and
Ethics of the Indian Constitution 230-246 (Oxford University Press, 2009).
116 Gopal Guru, “Constitutional Justice: Positional and Cultural” in Rajeev Bhargava, Politics and
Ethics of the Indian Constitution 230-246 (Oxford University Press, 2009).
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Democratic constitutionalism which endorses social justice in all educational spaces
will not only empower Pasmanda Bahujan but also liberate Ashraaf Savarna. Only
after ‘we the people of India’ are free from mutual hostility and fear can we constitute
India into a Sovereign, Socialist, Secular, Democratic, Republic and secure to all its
citizens: Justice, social, economic, and political.117
- Ayaz Ahmad*
Nachiketa Mittal**
117 Preamble to the Constitution of India, 1950.
*
Associate Professor at Karnavati University, Gandhinagar, Gujarat.
** Professor of Law and Independent Researcher.