Copy

Newsletter January 2024

NEWS & UPDATES

CHANGE MAKERS

SPOTLIGHT ON AFRICAN ENTREPRENEURSHIP

ALL OF THE ABOVE STRATEGY FOR DEVELOPMENT

African Giants: The 10 Largest Economies on The Continent

by Victor Oluwole 


African giants: The 10 largest economies on the continent
  • Nigeria and Egypt take the lead as Africa's biggest economies, each boasting a GDP of $477 billion.
  • Ethiopia and Kenya showcase rapid growth and innovation, drawing foreign investments and leading in tech-driven industries.

Amidst the ever-changing economic landscape of Africa, a select group of nations rises above the rest. They hold the key to shaping Africa's economic destiny. Their influence reverberates across the region, attracting investments and spearheading regional development. Join us on a journey of discovery as we uncover the economic powerhouses driving Africa's growth and influencing its economic trajectory.

1. Nigeria - $477 Billion: Nigeria's GDP of $477 billion crowns it as the largest economy in Africa. The nation's rapid growth in the financial sector and its leadership in petroleum exports fuel its economic might. Lagos, a burgeoning tech hub and the second-largest metropolitan area in Africa, further amplifies Nigeria's regional influence.

2. Egypt - $477 Billion: With a GDP of $477 billion, Egypt shares the top spot with Nigeria. Its economy boasts diverse industries, from tourism and agriculture to textiles and petroleum. Egypt's strategic location at the crossroads of Africa and the Middle East enhances its significance on the continent.

3. South Africa - $406 Billion: As a financial hub and industrial leader, South Africa commands a GDP of $406 billion. Its wealth of mineral resources and well-established industries attract global investments and drives economic growth in the region.

4. Algeria - $192 Billion: With abundant oil and natural gas reserves, Algeria's petrochemical industry contributes to its $192 billion GDP. This positions Algeria as a major economic force in North Africa.

5. Morocco - $134 Billion: Boasting a $134 billion GDP, Morocco shines as a rising star in North Africa. Its vibrant tourism and agriculture sectors, coupled with investments in renewable energy and industrialisation, bolster its economic standing.

6. Ethiopia - $127 Billion: Ethiopia's $127 billion GDP is fueled by a flourishing agricultural and manufacturing sector. As one of the fastest-growing economies, Ethiopia attracts foreign investments and nurtures a burgeoning middle class.

7. Kenya - $113 Billion: With a GDP of $113 billion, Kenya's innovative tech sector and business-friendly environment contribute to its economic success. Nairobi, a vibrant tech and business hub, hosts the African offices of global giants, amplifying Kenya's regional influence.

8. Angola - $107 Billion: Angola's focus on oil production and diamond mining supports its $107 billion GDP, establishing it as a significant player in Southern Africa. Efforts to diversify its economy are fostering growth and development.

9. Tanzania - $75.71 Billion: Tanzania's $75.71 billion GDP is propelled by thriving tourism, agriculture, and mining industries. Strategic ports and potential in natural gas contribute to Tanzania's expanding influence in East Africa.

10. Ghana - $72.84 Billion: With a $72.84 billion GDP, Ghana's stable political climate and flourishing industries, including cocoa production, mining, and oil exploration, garner global attention and contribute to the nation's economic strength.

Source: Trading Economics


This content was originally published on africa.businessinsider.com

“Chinese Banks Want to Be Repaid in Full”: Scepticism Greets China’s Debt Forgiveness

by Charlie Mitchell 

 
Image : Stefani Reynolds/AFP

China has agreed to forgive interest-free loans to 17 African countries as it seeks to dispel debt-trap allegations, but sceptics say that the days of Beijing writing off interest-bearing loans are over.

With African economies under severe strain from surging commodity prices and the tailwinds of Covid-19, hopes were high when Wang Yi, China’s top diplomat, took the stage for a major African debt announcement in August.

With a pomp not seen before in debt talks, Wang said Beijing had forgiven 23 interest-free loans to 17 African countries. He noted that the loans had matured, but remained tight-lipped about the total value and their recipients.

For cash-strapped African economies, many of whom count China as their largest bilateral creditor, the news that outstanding balances on Chinese government loans would be cancelled was well received. Around half of the continent is either in debt distress or at risk of it, with debt as a percentage of GDP worryingly high. All told, the world’s poorest countries – many of them in Africa – are facing $35bn in debt-service payments in 2022. Around 40% of that total is owed to China, according to the World Bank.

Interest-free Loans vs Interest Bearing Loans

However, while interest-free loan forgiveness could make a difference to Africa’s very poorest nations, it does not come as much of a surprise. In fact, no-interest loans make up a sliver of China’s lending to the continent. Some African governments even treat them as grants.

While the pageantry around the announcement could indicate an attempt by Beijing to tackle allegations of “debt-trap diplomacy”, analysts say it is unlikely to have an impact on China’s interest-bearing loans. And the current negotiations over Zambia’s debt obligations do not suggest Chinese banks are in a particularly forgiving mood.

Chinese lending to Africa peaked in 2016 at $29.5bn. By then it had already fuelled an infrastructure boom across the continent. As the leading external financier of infrastructure in Africa, Beijing built or upgraded 10,000km of railway, 100,000km of highway, 1,000 bridges and 100 ports, according to Chatham House, not to mention power plants, hospitals and schools. Kenya has Africa’s first urban expressway and a standard-gauge railway linking Nairobi and Mombasa thanks to Chinese credit.

Lauren Johnston, a professor at the University of Sydney’s China Studies Centre, says Chinese lending on the continent was initially underpinned by tumbling interest rates following the global financial crisis and a search for new markets, as well as a desire by Beijing to foster global development.

Today, she says, there’s a more immediate challenge in having to “manage a loan portfolio in the presence of global tensions and post-pandemic economic challenges.”

According to AidData, a research lab, interest-free loans account for less than 5% of the $843bn in Chinese loan commitments to 165 governments globally between 2000 and 2017. In the past two decades, China has written off at least $3.4bn of debt, almost all interest free loans to African countries, according to researchers from Johns Hopkins University.

They are considered part of China’s largesse in Africa, comparable to Beijing’s recent construction of Zimbabwe’s new parliament or a Lusaka’s state of the art conference centre, which came at no cost to either southern African country.

“Beijing has been doing debt write-offs of interest-free loans for 22 years,” says Deborah Brautigam, director of the China Africa Research Initiative at Johns Hopkins. “These interest-free loans come from China’s central government budget and have already been completely accounted for, like grants and unlike bank loans.”

While the write-offs are not new, experts say the pomp around the announcement is, reflecting Beijing’s frustration with allegations of debt-trap diplomacy, particularly from the US.

Both the Trump and Biden administrations have accused Beijing of deliberately lending to countries it knows cannot meet their obligations for political leverage, for instance to prompt a vote in China’s favour at the United Nations General Assembly or smooth the way for a well-placed Chinese port. A 2020 State Department document warned directly of China’s “predatory development programme and debt-trap diplomacy.”

Beijing ‘Irked’ by Debt-trap Allegations

Harry Verhoeven, senior researcher at Columbia University in New York, says the accusation does not hold water. In Djibouti, Uganda and South Sudan, which are often touted as possible debt trap victims, there is no evidence of Beijing making any such requests, he argues.

That has not stopped China from pushing to change the narrative. “It’s very clear that now, being on the receiving end of this kind of language for four or five years, Beijing is really quite irked by all of this,” Verhoeven says. “There is a felt need to push back and to actually show parts of African public opinion – perhaps even globally – that China is not the bogeyman the US and some of its Western allies are trying to make it out to be.”

During Kenya’s tense presidential election in August, winner William Ruto made Chinese debt a political football, vowing to publish secretive government contracts with Beijing and put an end to his predecessor’s excessive borrowing. Beyond the continent, Sri Lanka’s mounting public debt, some of it owed to China, led tens of thousands of Sri Lankans to storm the presidential palace in Colombo in July, perhaps worrying indebted African governments. Sri Lanka defaulted on its $47bn external debts last year.

Beijing dismisses the debt-trap claims as a hollow attempt by the US to reduce Chinese influence in Africa and boost its own. In August Wang condemned America’s “zero-sum Cold War mentality”.

While Hannah Ryder, chief executive of Development Reimagined, an African development consultancy in Beijing, has described interest-free loans as “the lowest-hanging fruit”, interest-bearing loans, which account for the vast majority of China’s lending, are quite another story.

Commercial loans can be restructured or reprofiled, but are almost never considered for cancellation, analysts say. Rather than coming through the government’s foreign aid programme, they go through China’s banks, which insist on being repaid. And with the Chinese economy stagnating somewhat compared to a decade ago, due in part to Beijing’s “zero-Covid” strategy, which shut down whole cities, that is unlikely to change.

“Chinese banks are reluctant to cancel or reduce the principal on bank loans inside China; doing this abroad would be unpopular among Chinese citizens,” says Brautigam. “Chinese banks want to be repaid in full.” In recent years China has reorientated its economy and is paying more attention to domestic and regional affairs. The boom times for African governments seeking Chinese loans appear to be over.

“Given the global economic winds that we see at the moment it’s important for Chinese lending institutions to be able to recoup much of the money they have made available to others,” says Verhoeven.“There was a time when China could just write off these things and say keep the change. Those days are over.” In fact, in the last couple of years Chinese lending to Africa has decreased significantly.

Johnston is open-minded about long-run prospects for debt relief. “Perhaps, far down the track [China] may offer debt relief,” she says, “[but] my sense is that China will first endure a long period of re-scheduling until ideally the loans are repaid.”

Zambia Debt Talks: a Sign of Things to Come?

While expectations of write-downs or haircuts on interest-carrying loans are low, many see Zambia, which became the first African country to default on its debt during the coronavirus pandemic, as a vital test of how much debt relief China will be willing to stomach.

Most of Africa’s debts to China are owed by five countries – Angola, Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria and Zambia – some of whom are seeking to reduce their reliance on Chinese loans in the future.

Zambia owes roughly $17bn to a combination of multilateral lenders, commercial bondholders and sovereign creditors, and a third of it to China. The country is requesting $4.8bn in debt relief over the next three years. Debt restructuring is being handled through the Common Framework for Debt Treatments, set up in 2020 by the G20 cohort of wealthy countries.

Restructuring got off to a slow start, with some blaming China for the delay, which Beijing denies. Yet the second meeting resulted in a breakthrough commitment, allowing the International Monetary Fund to sign off on a $1.3bn lending programme. In July, Zambia’s finance ministry announced it was cancelling $2bn of undisbursed loans from external creditors, $1.6bn of them from Chinese banks.

China initially wanted to eschew the Common Framework altogether, Beijing’s ambassador to Zambia said in August, before a call between President Xi Jinping of China and President Hakainde Hichilema of Zambia convinced China to join the talks. Many have been surprised by China’s willingness to negotiate in the face of its first debt crisis.

Still, negotiations remain tense. Analysts say China favours extending maturities over write-downs, even though Zambia’s finance minister, Situmbeko Musokotwane, told journalists in September that “the choice between haircuts and stretching the repayment period… is a matter of negotiations.” He added that some creditors “will choose to have their money faster” while others would opt for repayment over a longer period.

While Zambia is a useful test case, Verhoeven is wary of extrapolating it to the rest of the continent. “Zambia is pretty exceptional in terms of the composition of its debt, its important role as a copper producer, its history of defaults,” he says. “Zambia is not representative of the average African country and its debt profile, which is part of the reason I think why China has been willing to be, by Chinese standards, quite generous.”


This content was originally published on africa.business

Reform-Minded Change Makers

The “Unleash Africa” video feature has focused on the forces that are impeding the rise of African countries including corruption, on leadership qualities of the late Honorable Lee Kuan Yew, Prime Minister of Singapore and why that leadership quality is the missing ingredient in the governance apparatus of African countries, and on seminal entrepreneurs like Elon Musk who have redefined the playing arena of their enterprise and in some cases, a global paradigm shift.

BBC HARDtalk on the Road in Equatorial Guinea
In this video, Unleash Africa Newsletter focuses on a country that has tremendous economic potential because it has a small population but has good export revenues from gas and crude oil exports. However, the mismanagement, misappropriation of the countries resources has left the people of Equatorial Guinea impoverished and suffering destitution. 
Tarek Mouganie (Source: image supplied)
 

The Ghanaian Entrepreneur Who Sold His House In London To Build The Dreams Of SMEs  

by Peace Hyde
Affinity Africa founder Tarek Mouganie is addressing the challenges of the unbanked in his country through digital finance.

After dropping out of high school, Ibrahim Musa, a small business owner based in Ghana, has become somewhat of a serial entrepreneur. With stints in everything from cold stores, car sales and, most recently, selling electronic goods in Makola Market, the country’s busiest local market, his biggest challenge is actually in the digital sphere.

For years, Musa has faced a major snag when it comes to opening a bank account for his small business due to the many regulations involved.

“Every time I try and open a bank account, I am asked for so many documents that I simply do not have. After being rejected several times, I just decided to use mobile money for my banking needs but that is very limited because you cannot have access to the full range of services traditional banks offer and that is a real problem for entrepreneurs like me,” says Musa.

He is not wrong. The problem he speaks of affects over 500 million people across sub-Saharan Africa who do not have, amongst other things, proof of official identity documents. This is according to a 2017 article by the World Economic Forum. The knock-on effect of this problem is that it has led to over 350 million adults being financially excluded and expected to live on cash without the use of financial facilities, cited in a report by AfricaNenda.

For Ghanaian entrepreneur, Tarek Mouganie, the only way to tackle a problem like this is through the development of digital financial services. His solution, Affinity Africa, is a digital bank.

Mouganie holds an engineering degree from Imperial College London and PhD from the University of Cambridge. After working in the United Kingdom (UK) for a number of years, he decided to relocate back to Ghana to help solve the problems of the country’s unbanked and underbanked. It took Mouganie four and a half years to build the company and it finally launched in 2022.

“With no marketing spend, we have acquired 30,000 accounts just by word of mouth and, for 90% of our customers, we are their first-ever bank account. We have helped our customers save $23 million to date and have provided $13 million worth of loans as well. The average revenue of our borrowers has gone up by 500% and their employment base has gone by 3.5 times, so we are seeing growth,” says Mouganie.

The implementation of mobile money certainly is a silver lining for the future of the unbanked but according to Mouganie, it simply provides access. There is a deeper need to be addressed for small business holders.

“Our bank accounts are free, we don’t have any monthly charges and we provide interest across all accounts and that is a unique proposition. Our lending specifically focuses on small businesses which is what traditional banks don’t typically do,” says Mouganie.

He believes the problem is endemic to how African governments run their economies.

“If you look at OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries, the tax to GDP ratio is 33%. If you look at Africa, it is 16%. So, we are the lowest tax-paying continent in the world and for this reason, governments typically don’t have money which causes a huge amount of issues. But what is even worse is that a majority of our taxation is indirect –VAT, E-levy and other solutions that are quite regressive.”

“The reason that exists is because we have a huge informal sector and as a result of having been excluded from financial services, small business don’t get created,” Mouganie adds.

According to Mouganie, the reason why small businesses are important is because in developed countries, they employ about 60% of the population and drive about 50% of government revenue.

“In our part of the world, that is just not the case. So, to create employment and build resilient economies, we need to support small businesses, nurture them and encourage those new businesses to be registered, so that we can drive employment and socio-economic development,” says Mouganie.

This is, perhaps, what makes Affinity’s growth noteworthy.

The journey has been far from easy. The stringent process of obtaining a banking license has proven to be a challenge for many fintech entrepreneurs in the past. But Mouganie was so confident in his vision that he sold his house in London to invest in Affinity and set out to conquer the hurdle of regulatory approvals.

“Regulators exist because they are there to protect the consumer and who is the consumer? In our case, it is our customer and the regulator in Ghana wanted to support economic growth and support small businesses. We came up with a proposition of increasing financial inclusion in the true term and not just giving accessibility, which is what mobile money and digital money has done, but very much focus on affordability as well,” says Mouganie.

He founded Affinity with the aim to solve the problem of financial inclusion through digital finance and based on the growth Mouganie has achieved so far, the digital bank is ready to transform Ghana’s unbanked sector, one customer at a time.


This content was originally published on forbesafrica.com

Peace Hyde is a British-Ghanaian television producer, TV host, creator, journalist, and education activist.[2] She is the creator and executive producer of Netflix's first African reality TV series Young, Famous & African, as well as the Head of Digital Media and Partnership and West African correspondent at Forbes Africa.[3][4][5] She is the founder of Aim Higher Africa, a non-profit organization focused on improving the quality of education in impoverished communities across Africa.[6] In 2019, she was awarded the African Social Impact Award at the House of Parliament, House of Commons in the UK
September 27th, 2023. Opinion by Melaku Desta. Image : sabino.parente / Adobe Stock

Regional Value Chains Are Key to Africa’s Prosperity

by Melaku Desta  

By providing the framework to establish robust regional value chains, the African Continental Free Trade Area will help to develop the continent's industry and agriculture and drive prosperity.

The establishment of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) has been hailed, rightly, as having the potential to very considerably alter the continent’s fortunes for the better.

A good deal of this conviction is based on the AfCFTA’s principal mandate which is to forge regional value chains (RVCs).

Likewise, just as the AfCFTA fosters the establishment and consolidation of RVCs, so do strong RVCs provide the web of interconnected cogs and springs that keep the AfCFTA going deeper and further. The AfCFTA and RVCs are mutually reinforcing factors in the pursuit of Africa’s integration and development agenda.

African economies have been characterised by a heavy reliance on the export of raw materials, often failing to capture the full value of these resources. This traditional export model not only limits economic diversification but also perpetuates vulnerability to external shocks.

The AfCFTA offers a unique chance to reverse this trend by fostering intra-regional trade and encouraging the creation of RVCs.

The development of RVCs involves a multi-step process that encompasses various stages of production within a region, from raw material extraction and processing to production of intermediate goods, to final product assembly.

By focusing on these interconnected processes, African nations can collaborate to enhance their production capacities, technology sharing, and skills development, leading to a more robust and integrated economy.

The power of the AfCFTA to boost sustainable development by fostering RVCs comes out clearly in modelling by the UN Economic Commission for Africa, which has demonstrated that full implementation of the AfCFTA by all AU member states could boost intra-African trade by over a third ($196bn) by 2045 compared with a situation without AfCFTA.

Importantly, the impact of the AfCFTA is felt the most in the industrial sector, where ample opportunities exist for different state parties to specialise in the production of specific parts and components of the final product, seamlessly connected by RVCs.

ECA analysis has confirmed that, with a few exceptions, the bulk of the absolute gains in national exports to the rest of Africa following AfCFTA implementation is concentrated in industrial products.

Among the most promising RVCs are those for pharmaceuticals, baby food, textiles and apparel, and automobiles. The development of these industries transfers skills, creates jobs, reduces demand for hard currency to finance imports, etc.

Importantly, this also reduces Africa’s vulnerabilities due to its excessive dependence on imports for such essential products as medicines and food, which were laid bare by the Covid-19 pandemic and the Russia-Ukraine crisis recently.

As noted earlier, one of the most significant advantages of RVCs is the potential for job creation. As countries specialise in specific stages of production within a value chain, they not only increase efficiency but also generate employment opportunities. This is particularly crucial for a continent with a burgeoning youth population, where unemployment rates remain alarmingly high – while informal women-owned businesses are hit especially hard.

By participating in RVCs, African nations can harness the energy and creativity of their young workforce, effectively channelling their talents towards productive and sustainable economic activities.


Technology Transfer

Furthermore, the development of RVCs can contribute to technology transfer and knowledge sharing among countries. As African nations collaborate on different production stages, they can pool resources and expertise, fostering innovation and the adoption of advanced technologies. This shared learning will not only lead to improvements in productivity but also strengthen the continent’s overall technological capabilities.

In the agricultural sector, where the opportunities for RVCs are relatively more modest, its potential has been further limited by market fragmentation, inadequate infrastructure, and market access barriers.

Harnessing the power of a well-developed agribusiness value chain holds the key to unlocking food security and rural development across the continent.

Creating a robust and integrated value chain requires collaboration among various stakeholders, including farmers, agribusiness enterprises, processors, distributors, and retailers. By connecting these actors, African nations can foster a more efficient, inclusive, and resilient agribusiness sector.

One of the foremost benefits of a well-functioning agribusiness value chain is the potential to enhance food security and reduce post-harvest losses.

In many African countries, a significant portion of agricultural produce is lost due to inadequate storage and transportation facilities. A comprehensive value chain approach can address these challenges by improving infrastructure, cold storage facilities, and transportation networks. This, in turn, ensures that more produce reaches consumers, stabilising food prices and reducing the risk of shortages.

Furthermore, a robust agribusiness value chain can drive rural development and poverty alleviation. By strengthening value chains, rural communities can benefit from increased access to markets, higher income opportunities, and improved living standards.

Additionally, value chain development can encourage the adoption of modern farming techniques, technology, and knowledge transfer, enabling farmers to enhance their productivity and overall wellbeing.


Raw Material Database

The development of robust agri-food value chains at the national level is a prerequisite for the establishment of RVCs that can serve the regional and continental food security imperatives.

Similar opportunities exist in other sectors such as pharmaceuticals, automotive, textiles and apparel. ECA works closely with its partners in supporting the development of RVCs in several areas, such as the project to set up an Africa-wide database of raw materials and inputs for the textile industry in the context of the AfCFTA.

The AfCFTA creates unique opportunities for businesses in different parts of the continent to specialise in the production of components in which they have the competitive advantage.

When those parts are put together to produce a final product, everyone benefits. The AfCFTA makes this possible – and profitable – for everyone involved. What is often forgotten is that, these RVCs that are made possible by the AfCFTA also provide the network of industry and commercial relationships that oils and propels the AfCFTA project, taking the integration of national markets deeper, further and faster. This way, the AfCFTA and RVCs reinforce each other.


This content was originally published on african.business

Melaku Desta is coordinator of the African Trade Policy Centre at the UN Economic Commission for Africa.

Plantain waste can be reduced in Nigeria and used in the production of wine. Getty Images

Nigeria’s Plantain Wine: a Traditional Drink with Huge Economic Potential
by Malomo Adekunbi Adetola 

Agadagidi, a wine made from plantain, is a popular drink at festive occasions in Nigeria. But it’s not always of a high quality.

It is usually produced in the southern part of the country in limited quantities because it is difficult to store. Akwa-Ibom, Cross River, Imo, Enugu, Rivers, Edo, Delta, Lagos, Ogun, Osun and Oyo states are known for plantain cultivation.

Our study examined ways to improve the production of agadagidi and ultimately create more jobs.

Agadagidi is traditionally produced from overripe plantain by fermenting the juice, known as must, for three days and filtering it thereafter. The juice has a cloudy appearance, is effervescent and has a sweet-sour taste.

Given that plantain is readily available in the country, and imported wines are expensive, we conducted research to establish if it was possible to make better quality agadagidi.

In Nigeria the agricultural sector employs about 70% of the labour force and contributes about 30% of the national GDP. Smallholder farmers account for almost 90% of the total food production.

But losses due to poor post-harvest practices can reach up to 50% for some fresh food produce. Half of the food that is produced for humans never gets consumed. The country grapples with food insecurity partly due to bottlenecks such as high food losses along its food supply chains. Farmers also lose out on income.

Plantain production increased from 994,000 tonnes in 1972 to 3.12 million tonnes in 2021. The average production increase is 2.75% which could be a boon to the economy if well managed.

Our study was carried out to optimise the production process to make it safe and of consistent quality. This would be beneficial in a number of ways: it would reduce reliance on imported wine, reduce waste and encourage the production of indigenous wineries, thereby creating jobs and boosting Nigeria’s economy.

How We Conducted Our Research

One batch of agadagidi was produced using the traditional method. We also produced agadagidi using controlled fermentation and divided the liquid separated into six batches testing various scenarios using sodium metabisulphite and wine yeast. Some of the samples were pasteurised and some not.

All samples were fermented for three days and dispensed into sterile bottles.

Microbial count, pH and acidity were determined at a weekly intervals for a period of three weeks.

Microorganisms were identified to determine the safety of the products and the consumer acceptability test was also assessed.

Our Findings

All the unpasteurised samples treated with sodium metabisulphite with or without the addition of wine yeast were acceptable in terms of microbial count, physicochemical properties and consumer acceptability.

Our method could be replicated on a large scale using the same materials we did. It’s also made easier with the abundant plantain in Nigeria. The country can generate more jobs for its teeming young population. Nigeria’s unemployment rate is expected to rise to 40.6% in 2023 as compared to 2022’s 37.7%, and as high as 43.9% in 2024.

Our findings show that plantain waste can be reduced and used in production of wine. The quantity of imported wine consumed in Nigeria increased from 26.7 to 33.1 million litres from 2015 to 2021. In 2021, Nigeria spent US$116 million on wine imports, becoming the 36th largest importer of wine in the world.

Optimisation of locally produced wine will reduce reliance on imported wine and boost the country’s economy, especially in these days of scarce foreign exchange.


This content was originally published on theconversation.com

Malomo Adekunbi Adetola obtained B. Tech in Food science from Ladoke Akintola University of Technology, Ogbomoso, Nigeria in 2007; M.Sc and Ph.D in Food Science and Technology from Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile- Ife in 2012 and 2016 respectively. She was employed as an Assistant lecturer in the Department of Food Science and Technology, Obafemi Awolowo university, Ile - Ife, Nigeria on March 3rd, 2014. She is presently a Senior lecturer.

She is a part adviser, the examination processing officer, representative to the Faculty of Agriculture, University Research Bulletin Team and Mentor to OAU STARS

She is a Member of Nigerian Institute of Food Science and Technology (MNIFST: 06/3804/SM); American Society for Microbiology (ASM ID: 54501388) and Organization for Women in Science for the Developing World (OWSD) (OWSD: 5174)

Accelerating The Deployment Of Clean Energy Projects Across Africa

by BrandVoice Partner | Paid Program 

One of the first words that spring to mind when people think of Africa is ‘sun’. No wonder. Africa is blessed with more sunshine than any other continent on earth.

The future, however, could be much brighter. That’s because the sun is set to become one of the biggest energy sources for the world. The power of the sun is indisputable. If we could harvest just one day of the sun’s energy, it would power the earth for a year.

And Africa is the solar power center of the world. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), the continent is home to 60% of the best solar resources globally, but houses only 1% of installed solar PV capacity.

The African Development Bank has published estimates suggesting Africa has a potential capacity of 10TW of solar power. But it’s not just the sun. The IEA estimates the sub-Saharan region of Africa alone has 1,300GW wind energy potential and the continent has the capacity to produce 5,000 megatonnes of hydrogen per year.

Despite the wealth of resources at Africa’s disposal, almost 570 million people on the continent live without power. So how does Africa realize its untapped potential to help fuel the continent’s – and the earth’s – future energy needs?

The benefits of achieving that goal are enormous. Renewable energy offers Africa a central role in the new model for cleaner industrialization and economic growth. Investing in renewable energy reduces the continent’s dependence on fossil fuel imports, ensuring a more secure and stable energy supply for economic activities.

As renewable energy technologies like solar and wind become increasingly cost-competitive, they help to lower energy costs and stimulate economic competitiveness. For perspective, in 2006 the cost of a kilowatt hour of solar energy was over$2. Today it is less than two cents.
 

The transition to renewables also presents a vast opportunity for job creation, particularly in manufacturing, installation, operation, and maintenance of renewable energy infrastructure, benefiting the economy and local communities.

But while the fruits of a successful transition are clear, the question remains, how does Africa get there?

One of the clouds casting a shadow over Africa’s sunny future is the lack of available finance. In its World Energy Transitions Outlook 2023 report, the International Renewable Energy Agency noted the widening investment gap between the Global North and South, pointing out that Africa accounted for only 1% of additional renewable energy capacity in 2022.

That message was reinforced in June by COP28 President-Designate and Masdar Chairman, Dr Sultan Al Jaber at a roundtable discussion at the Summit for a New Global Financing Pact in Paris, when he remarked: “Climate finance is nowhere near available enough, accessible enough and affordable enough – especially for countries in the Global South.”

To appreciate the scale of the issue, it’s worth noting that clean energy investment in Africa represents only 2% of the global total. According to the IEA, to achieve its energy and climate goals, Africa would need investment of $190 billion each year from 2026 to 2030, with two-thirds going to clean energy. That would take the share of energy investment in Africa’s GDP to 6.1% in the 2026-30 period, but Africa’s energy investment would still be only around 5% of the global total.

The IEA has called on multilateral development banks to make increasing financial flows to Africa “an absolute priority”, arguing the banks should increase concessional finance to Africa and use it more strategically “to better leverage private capital. This includes domestic financial markets, which need to more than double in size by the second-half of this decade”. It conceded, however, that high debt burdens remain a challenge to investments.

As a nation, the UAE has sought to raise public and private sector funds to invest in the development of Africa’s renewable energy sector with the Etihad 7 initiative, which has set a target of 20GW of capacity to supply 100 million people across the continent with clean electricity by 2035.

The UAE’s flagship renewable energy company, Masdar, is heavily involved in the initiative, with agreements for projects that have a combined generation capacity of 7GW in Uganda, Angola, Zambia and Tanzania.

A first mover in pioneering energy projects in Africa for over a decade, Masdar, through its Infinity Power platform, holds more than 2GW of clean energy projects across the continent including Egypt, Morocco, Senegal, Mauritania, and South Africa. Masdar has already deployed $2 billion of capital to Africa and is on track to deliver 10GW of renewable energy projects across the continent by 2030.

In September this year, Masdar announced it was mobilizing $10 billion of investment to accelerate 10GW of clean energy projects in Africa, as part of the UAE’s investment initiative announced at Africa Climate Week.

Masdar’s Chief Executive Officer, Mohamed Jameel Al Ramahi, said: As the largest renewable energy company in Africa, it is fitting that Masdar, with its Infinity Power platform, should take this bold step forward which will unlock much needed investment for the energy transition. Africa is a key strategic market for Masdar and we are proud of our history of clean energy projects there.”

Positive actions like these that help accelerate the delivery of finance to the development of clean energy projects in Africa are needed more than ever if the continent is to achieve its full potential as one of the world’s leading renewable energy providers.

Africa deserves a future where its name is synonymous with words like ‘energy’ and ‘power’. The UAE and Masdar are doing their part to make it happen.

DISCLAIMER: Brand Voice is a paid program. Articles appearing in this section have been commercially supported.


This content was originally published on forbesafrica.com.com

BrandVoice is connecting business to Forbes’ influential global audiences by promoting the thought leadership of executives, sharing expertise and celebrating achievement with people-focused storytelling. Over the course of 10 years, nearly 300 partners, 20,000 posts and more than 300 million page views, BrandVoice has delivered the results brands that are looking for. By providing cross-platform promotions, high levels of discoverability, targeting, transparency and expert consultancy at each stage, Forbes ensures stories, insights and points of view consistently reach and resonate with the right audience.

Olivier Becht, minister of foreign trade for France (REA)

French Media Need to ‘Change Their Idea of Africa’ – Olivier Becht

by Nicholas Norbrook 

France’s minister for foreign trade discusses the growth of French companies on the continent and the multiple opportunities offered by Nigeria’s fast-growing population.

France is going through a tough time on the continent. Pushed out of several countries in the Sahel; facing off with the deep pockets of Russian propagandists; accused of failing to modernise its relations with former colonies, its ­burgeoning economic relationship with Nigeria is an opportunity to focus on something different.

Business potential is a balm for French officials focused on Africa who are frustrated with the geo­political dynamic of recent years. Olivier Becht, the minister for foreign trade, economic attractiveness and French nationals abroad, spent three days in Nigeria in late November.

His visit culminated in a meeting of the France Nigeria Business Council, which brought together the leading players in Nigeria’s corporate world with French officials and CEOs.

Becht spoke with The Africa Report amidst the clatter of the reception hosted by Herbert Wigwe of Access Bank – which opened a branch in Paris in May 2023.

Is France ‘feeling the heat’ on the continent?

Olivier Becht: This period of diplomatic tension that we are going through with countries in the Sahel is not representative of how France is investing itself across the 54 countries of the continent.

When we look at France’s engagement more closely, there are twice as many French companies present in Africa than a decade ago, and three times as much French direct investment. It shows that France is in no way bowing out and that it is far from being ‘chased out’ as some media suggest.

For us, Nigeria is a strategic country. It is one of the biggest economies, with the largest population and whose demographic growth will reach around 400 million people over the next 25 years.

That’s bigger than the US in a quarter of a century, and a market that is growing each day. So we are present, and France is building investment here.

More and more [investors] are getting interested in this market – and that is a good thing.

Are some sectors, such as agriculture and energy, more favoured than others?

There are the sectors where we have been present for a long time, like energy, oil and gas, and more recently renewable energies, with solar parks and tomorrow perhaps windfarms, which help Nigeria’s energy transition. There is health, which we are getting increasingly involved in. Infrastructure remains important, and then there are the new areas that French companies are entering, notably tech.

There is a strong French tech presence in Lagos, which is celebrating its 10th anniversary.

There are economic partners in Africa, from Gulf countries to China, who offer the ability to build infrastructure as well as the financing for establishing the infrastructure. Can France compete with them?

France is not lagging when it comes to finance. When you look at French investment in Nigeria, there is $3bn from the Agence Française de Développement (AFD), there is Proparco [France’s private-sector finance arm], you have concessional finance from the treasury at near-zero interest rates … So we can compete on equal terms with the Chinese and other economic competitors, which is how it should be.

What the French can bring compared to the Chinese is high environmental quality and local content. We employ locals living near worksites so that the value added is not only created but also shared with Nigerians.

How does your ministry work? How do you identify opportunity, as an institution?

We are part of France’s economic diplomacy. The economic operators we have are Business France, the French Chamber of Commerce abroad and BPI France, the national investment bank. We help accompany French companies that have expressed an interest in expanding into a particular country; sometimes we also find companies in France that we take along with us to countries because we have spotted opportunities for them.

The role of the ministry is to build high-level relationships in target countries – with the authorities and with big domestic investors – to allow our companies to grow.

Some French, and more broadly, Western, media have negative opinions about Lagos, and when they visit they are surprised by how developed the city is. This is your first time in Lagos – was this your reaction, too?

This is the case in many African countries and it is high time that French media change the idea they have of Africa, which is out of date, and realise that Africa is the continent of 21st-century growth.

Not just demographic growth; over 40% of Africans are urban – these are not people who live in huts in the savannah. Certainly, this demographic growth drives economic growth. That is why we need to be involved in this dynamic and to bring French companies with their respective strengths.

For example, in the treatment of wastewater, Veolia is the leading company worldwide; Alstom is a leading company in urban transport; Eiffage is a global leader in creating infrastructure; as well as ADP and SNCF groups, world leaders in airports and rail.

That is what French media need to grasp, and change the image of Africa that they have, to show that the continent is taking off.

The demography going in the other direction is cruel perhaps. European SMEs [small and medium-sized enterprises], for example, are often run by older people. How do you encourage them to consider investing in Africa when they are likely to be highly risk-averse?

Not necessarily. You have Philippe Matière who is present here in Nigeria, for example, [who runs] an SME that is involved in bridge construction in Africa. There have been several SME representatives that I invite to come with me when I travel to the continent.

The problem with French businesses is not that they don’t think about Africa per se; it’s that they rarely think about international growth in general. That is the real problem. Our SMEs need to understand that in this world prone to shocks, you can’t put all your eggs in one basket, or in one geography. You have to diversify.

Certainly, for a French SME, it would be easier in the first instance to expand in Europe, but they have to think about Africa as a real market, which will have the same amount of consumers (or possibly more) at the same level of purchasing power as the European Union.


This content was originally published on theafricareport.com

Nicholas Norbrook is a founding editor of The Africa Report. He previously worked for Radio France Internationale and Africa Confidential. His research focuses on industrialization, Asia’s growth trajectory, and the political economy of the nation-state.

Building a Success Culture in African Countries 19 : Transforming Equatorial Guinea with Purpose-Driven Economic Strategy

by John I. Akhile Sr. 

As emphasized in this column ad infinitum, corruption has robbed African countries of the level and degree of concentration borne of singleness of purpose. Not only have African countries failed to partake in crucial trade and finance trends that are potentially beneficial, but they have also failed to evolve indigenous responses to opportunities presented in the global market. The actual cost of corruption is vast and unquantifiable. Money from corruption also leaves African countries to fund development in wealthy Western countries that do not need or want it. Some, of course, wind up in offshore havens around the world. One of the most egregious examples is Equatorial Guinea, but there are others, so this is not to judge them. It is worthy of note that the root cause of the corruption of Equatorial Guinea is the influence of competing externalities seeking concessions and access to business opportunities. That, and the heritage of “our time to chop embedded in the entitlement consciousness of the leaders.”¹ It is not reasonable for anybody in a government, unless it is a monarchy with unfettered access to the country’s resources, to have nearly $500 million in assets.² The World Bank calculated the GDP per capita of Equatorial Guinea for 2022 to be $17,620.70. However, “the country’s citizens live in desperate poverty, with over 60 percent struggling to survive on less than $1 a day. Despite having sufficient natural resources—especially oil and gas—and the billions of dollars these resources bring in, the country is marked by chronic hunger, a crumbling education system, frequent blackouts, poor sanitation, and disease. This chasm between the country's natural resources and the poverty of its people raises a basic question: if money from the sale of Equatorial Guinea’s natural resources is not benefiting its citizens, where is it going?”³,⁴

The Lifestyle depicted in the son of the leader of Equatorial Guinea is precisely what is ruining African countries because the behavior is contagious, as has been shown since independence. In fairness to Teodorin Obiang. He does not know any better. He doesn’t know that the countries where he is pouring the money belonging to the poor people of his country are the same countries from where aid resources are sent to feed, clothe, educate, and house the poor of Equatorial Guinea. It is ironic that a country is hosting hundreds of millions of dollars of assets for a leader whose economic and social infrastructure is decrepit and broken down completely and is in desperate need of aid from the host country of the leader’s financial largess. More important is that the financial and political systems in the countries know that the money he is spending was not earned but stolen. That is because intrepid journalists, through freedom of information, can access secret bank and government records. Two institutions in virtually every Western country know of such activities. One is the government's internal and external investigative arm, and two is the financial institutions that are the repository of such stolen funds. 

It is rank ignorance of the worst kind. He is blind to his and his father’s responsibility to uplift the people of his country. He can do that by reflecting on what he admires about the countries he chose to display his ill-gotten wealth and working to make himself accountable to the people of his country. Equatorial Guinea has the potential to ascend the economic ladder to a mini-Singapore. They have a short window to change things. The era of the Oil and Gas industry as an engine of economic growth is slowly ebbing due to the massive effort in the West to turn to renewable energy sources to power vehicles and everything else.

The leader of Equatorial Guinea doesn't need to repress his people. Instead, he needs to liberate them through education and creating work opportunities by forming a private sector capable of investing in commerce and industry. The opportunity to transform the economic fortunes of the people of Equatorial Guinea is easier to accomplish there than in most other African countries because it is a classic case of a small population and high external revenues. That’s how the United States he loves was built and, similarly, the European countries he loves. Teodorin is not the evil he is portrayed to be in Western media. He is a victim of a pattern he and the people of the world have witnessed in African countries for decades. African leaders rob their people’s treasury and spend the money in wealthy Western countries because they like the lifestyle in the countries. It doesn’t occur to them that political and business leaders built Western societies through blood, sweat, and toil. He doesn’t see the irony that his family is supposed to be building Equatorial Guinea using the resources he and the cabal that is running Equatorial Guinea are spending in Western countries. It is his responsibility to invest Equatorial Guinea’s resources for the advancement of her people. Fortunately, there are examples of countries that have transitioned from poverty to success for the leadership to mirror. The most obvious example is Singapore. But South Korea is also a close second. 

Building offices, free-standing hotels, and resorts to host meetings is not economic development. Especially when they are not income-generating. Equatorial Guinea has done a lot of none-income generating projects during the rulership of the current president. They have built a university and a new city amid a massive poverty infestation of the country. Vanity projects that do not earn an income and are not self-sustaining are not economic development. They create few jobs but not the tens of thousands that true economic development schemes can create. Vanity projects harken back to the wave of projects African countries implemented during the first phase of economic development efforts post-independence. The surge of such projects directly led to the first depth crisis in African countries. Here is how most of it unfolded.

The drivers of most of the projects were mostly foreign external sales executives whose motivation was to sell a project, and (rightfully, because it was not their responsibility) they did not consider whether it was beneficial to the country—virtually every one of the projects involved kickbacks to principals in the countries who approved the project and who were supposed to vet the efficacy. All projects, including basic infrastructure projects such as roads and bridges, were impacted. As a result of the kickbacks, the projects all cost more than the market price, and the kickbacks left the country for foreign banks—a lose-lose proposition for the countries. The accumulation of poorly conceived and executed projects, none-income generating projects, then referred to as Elephant schemes, led to the inability of nations to service the debts taken out on them. With the 1970s changes in the global market due to higher fuel costs, economic stagnation in Western countries, and low non-fuel commodity prices, the 1980s and 1990s were a debt-ridden period of economic depression, exacerbation of poverty, and coup d’etat, civil war in many African countries.  

Here is how the IMF (International Monetary Fund) saw it: 
Equatorial Guinea has a small population of about 1 million people. Therefore, moving the economic needle in the country with purpose-driven economic development centered around creating work for the people will show quick results. The country needs a sustainable economic development strategy based on education, job creation, and export revenues from manufacturing, processing, tourism, and services. This is a concerted strategy that requires all the brain capacity of the leadership of Equatorial Guinea. Still, they can do it because they have access to advisory capability. The country has the resources to diversify its economic base from crude oil and gas to encompass manufacturing and processing industries for export.

This economic development strategy is the only one that has succeeded in the modern era and directly created the Asian Tiger phenomenon and the economy of modern China. The strategy is being executed in the contemporaneous era by Vietnam post the Vietnam War and shows tremendous results for the country. There is no need to reinvent the wheel. The wheel works. Leaders need to figure out how to work it in their environments. Japan is the original mastermind of the strategy. It took Japan from the devastation of WWII to its remarkable economic rise to the 2nd largest economy in the world before the emergence of China. It is a simple strategy that starts with goal-setting and a determined implementation of the tactics undergirding the strategy—industrial manufacturing and processing for exports, service industries for exports, and a vast tourism program to bring foreign visitors to enjoy the beaches and warm weather and other attractions that the government will initiate to compliment the natural endowment and to spend their hard currency in the economy of Equatorial Guinea. Suppose the country's leaders can evolve a strategy and execute the tactics. In that case, Equatorial Guinea will move from being a pariah state to a showcase of African leadership and innovation in our generation, but time is running short…. Read the next installment of this series in next month’s Unleash Africa Newsletter

1 https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/07/28/france-equatorial-guinea-vice-presidents-conviction-upheld 
2 https://www.justiceinitiative.org/publications/corruption-and-its-consequences-equatorial-guinea 
3 https://www.justiceinitiative.org/publications/corruption-and-its-consequences-equatorial-guinea 
4 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZGHma3QUF08 
5 https://www.elibrary.imf.org/display/book/9781557751423/ch04.xml 
John I. Akhile Sr. is the author of two books: Compensatory Trade Strategy: How to Fund Import-Export Trade and Industrial Projects When Hard Currency is in Short Supply and now Unleashed: A New Paradigm of African Trade with the World. He is also the President of African Trade Group LLC., a U.S. based trading company.

Kenya Fresh

A Feature of Unleash Africa Editorial Team

Today, Kenya Fresh is at the forefront of growing and exporting fresh fruits and vegetables in Kenya. This dates to the year 2004, when operations kick-started.

They continuously quest for innovation, freshness, diversity, and excellence to bring produce from the farm to the shelves and ultimately to the consumers’ tables. The company’s overwhelming focus remains on living up to our quality promise to our customers, driven by our motto, “freshness you can bank on.” The company is a leading exporter of fresh, quality organic fruits and vegetables. The continual growth has been instigated by several factors and initiatives, including strategic market-based agreements with organized growers, committed staff, and proximity of packing facilities to growing regions and the main airport, Jomo Kenyatta International Airport as a transshipment port.

 

The company exports vegetables, Fruits, and fresh herbs. The company is a certified exporter to significant markets in the world. Kenya Fresh Produce Exporters Ltd is a limited liability company incorporated under the Kenyan Companies Act in 2003. it sources and exports a broad range of fresh vegetables, fruits, and cut flowers from Kenya. All fresh fruits and vegetable exports conform to domestic and international food standards.
Unleash Africa Editorial Team

Editorial

Unleash Africa’s rai·son d'ê·tre is to share contents that stimulate discussions about development paths and options for the countries of Africa because the prevailing winds are not favorable and change is necessary. Throughout Africa, poverty and its attendant cargo of ills is expressing itself in grotesquely violent ways. It portends a future of certain militarist conflagration the like of which the continent has not experienced because the embers of conflagration will be supplied by a very large and largely hopeless, youth population. Whether it’s Boko Haram in Northern Nigeria, Niger Delta Avengers in Southern Nigeria, Al-Shabbab in Kenya, unrest in Mali and Central Africa, political and economic disenchantment in South Africa, the smoldering yet unquenched embers of the Arab Spring in Northern Africa, the continent is perched on a cauldron of volcanic socio-economic-political faults. Add to that mix the drop in global commodity prices, especially crude oil, and it is not surprising that voices of consequence in the affairs of the countries are beginning to sound an alarm about rising debt of African countries. "All of the Above Strategy for Development" highlights outside-the-box and traditional export-oriented business strategies that point the way for policy makers to intensify policy prescription in order to maximize or start to implement them.

 In this feature, there are lessons for African leaders everywhere they turn or look in the world. It is also FREE. In this work, Vietnam, a relative new comer in the economic transformation process, is now being used as a model of a country that is rising from the depths of economic ruin. Poorer than poor after the Vietnam war, their journey is juxtaposed with the challenges of several African countries. It is instructive for what African leaders should be doing if they truly want to elevate their countries from impoverishment. It is also instructive that Vietnam is following a pattern established by the Asian Tiger economies, Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore and China–although China is in it’s own category as an economic power but it is an absolute truism that the late Deng Xiaoping emulated the Tigers and Japan, who is the originator of the concept of export-oriented industrialization, EOI. 

Economic Reform and Export-Oriented Industrialization: An Applicable Model for LDCs?

By Changyong Choi and Balazs Szalontai
KDI School of Public Policy and Management & Korea University

 
Vietnam’s initial social and economic indicators were also comparable to that of the selected African countries:²³ Vietnam’s achievements were certainly substantial but they should not be summarily juxtaposed to the entire group of African states. In 2009, the rate of urbanization in most African countries still surpassed Vietnam’s. Only Ethiopia and Tanzania had a lower level of urbanization – that is, the very same states that had been in a similar situation in 1989. In per capita GDP, however, Vietnam managed to overtake Guinea and Zambia. In 2009, only oil-rich Angola and Congo-Brazzaville had a higher per capita GDP than Vietnam. In the share of exports in GDP, Vietnam showed even greater progress. In 2006-2009, Congo-Brazzaville was the sole country that consistently surpassed it, and the export levels of six countries (Benin, Ethiopia, Guinea, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia) remained consistently lower than Vietnam’s.

In nominal terms, the gap between the richer and poorer countries seems to have increased between 1986/1989 and 2006/2009. In 1989, the per capita GDP of the richest country (Congo-Brazzaville) was 6.27 times higher than that of the poorest country (Mozambique). Vietnam’s per capita GDP was 2.57 times higher than that of Mozambique but 2.44 times lower than that of Congo-Brazzaville. In 2009, the per capita GDP of the richest country (Angola) was 10.44 times higher than that of the poorest country (Ethiopia). Vietnam’s per capita GDP was 3.22 times higher than that of Ethiopia but 3.23 times lower than that of Angola. From this perspective, Vietnam’s position within the group of selected countries did not undergo much change. In both periods, Vietnam occupied a median position between the richest and poorest countries, with an almost identical distance from both extremes.

The sphere in which Vietnam achieved the greatest transformation was the composition of exports. As noted before, in the late 1980s Vietnam’s exports were dominated by agricultural products, marine products, and mineral products. To assess the results of Vietnam’s EOI strategy, Table 2 shows Vietnam’s export structure in 2007, compared with the export structure of six selected African countries (2006-2010, depending on the availability of data).²⁴ The composition of exports was described according to the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) codes:

If Categories 6, 7, and 8 are merged into a single category of industrial exports, the combined share of such products in Vietnam’s export structure reached 52.5% by 2007 – a very significant change if compared to the composition of Vietnamese exports in the late 1980s. This percentage was considerably higher than the share of industrial exports in any of the selected African countries except Mozambique (59.2%). That is, Vietnam surpassed Congo-Brazzaville (30.1%), Tanzania (17.9%), Ethiopia (15.3%), Benin (12.6%), and Guinea (10%). Furthermore, a closer examination of the export/import structure and industrial capacity of Mozambique and Congo-Brazzaville reveals serious anomalies behind their apparently favorable performance. Mozambique’s SITC 6 exports (the largest section of its industrial exports) were composed near-exclusively of unwrought aluminum.²⁵ In Congo-Brazzaville, machinery and transport equipment (particularly ships, boats, and barges) constituted the largest category of industrial exports (the total value of such exports stood at $1.787 million in 2010). Nevertheless, the country’s manufacturing sector, dominated as it was by food processing and light industries, lacked the technological capacity to manufacture such equipment. Thus these manufactured exports seem to have been actually re-exports. In 2010, goods of this type did constitute the largest share in the country’s imports, with a total value of $2.598.8 million.²⁶

Vietnam’s industrial exports, which were based on domestic production, showed a greater variety and a higher stage of procession. In 2007, various types of clothes, footwear, and furniture constituted the largest categories of Vietnamese manufactured exports. Moreover, Vietnam’s entire export structure was of a more versatile nature than that of the selected African countries. Apart from creating an export-oriented industrial sector, the country also remained able to export agricultural goods and mineral fuels in considerable quantities (19.2% and 20.7% of total exports, respectively).²⁷ This versatility strongly differed from the less balanced export structure of the selected African countries. The export structure of Benin, Ethiopia, and Tanzania was dominated by agricultural goods and crude materials (whose total share ranged from 52.7% to 82.8%), whereas the share of industrial exports remained well below 20%, and fuel exports were virtually absent. The exports of Congo-Brazzaville and Guinea were based primarily on their rich oil and bauxite reserves, respectively, and neither agriculture nor domestic industry made any significant contribution. Thanks to its agricultural potential, coal and hydrocarbon reserves, and aluminum smelters, Mozambique achieved a higher degree of versatility, but, as mentioned before, its industrial exports were virtually limited to unwrought aluminum.

The following observations may be made about the long-term export performance of the selected African countries: The oil-rich countries (Angola and Congo-Brazzaville) were particularly extreme cases of structural inflexibility. During the 16-year period under examination, crude oil and oil products constituted a minimum of 73% of their exports in any year, while their maximum percentage reached a level of 94-95%. Apart from oil, they exported only a very limited range of goods, and these products were also natural resources (diamonds in Angola, timber in Congo-Brazzaville). Both agricultural produces and domestically manufactured industrial goods were conspicuous by their insignificance throughout the entire period; only coffee (Angola) and sugar (Congo-Brazzaville) made a certain contribution. The predominance of oil in Angolan and Congolese exports also reveals that the apparently favorable performance of these two countries, like their high per capita GDP and the high percentage of exports in their GDP, was near-exclusively based on their superabundant oil reserves.²⁸

Guinea and Zambia, two countries rich in mineral resources but devoid of hydrocarbon reserves, were also seriously affected by the problem of resource dependency. Throughout the examined period, a single mineral product (bauxite and copper, respectively) consistently ranked first among their export goods. Nevertheless, their dependency on these specific mineral products underwent a gradual decline. From an initial level of 66-92%, the percentage of these products decreased to 44-48%, and thus the structural inflexibility of Guinea and Zambia seems to have been less extreme than that of Angola and Congo-Brazzaville. At the same, this process of diversification was of a limited scope. Guinea managed to transform a part of its bauxite production into alumina, but the percentage of bauxite exports remained more than twice higher than that of alumina exports. An IMF report dated 2008 made the following observations: “Production of alumina relative to bauxite is [...] low compared to other bauxite producing countries. [...] The country has one alumina plant and no aluminum refinery. Hence, only about 4 percent of total bauxite production is locally transformed into alumina whereas the rest is exported as unrefined ore.”²⁹ Other factors behind the decreasing percentage of bauxite exports were the long-term fall in Guinea’s bauxite export price and the increase of gold and diamond exports (from 13.6% in 1989 to 21.7% in 2003). That is, the shifts in the composition of Guinean exports occurred within the mineral-based sector of the economy (mining and alumina refining). The diversification process did not lead to a significant increase of agricultural exports, nor did the country export industrial products unrelated to the mining sector. Similarly, Zambia’s pre-2003 diversification process remained mostly confined to the mining sector, for the decreasing percentage of copper exports (which reflected a decline in copper production) was interrelated with the growth of cobalt exports – a linkage reinforced by the fact that cobalt production was a by-product of copper mining. It occurred as late as 2003 that tobacco and iron alloys started to make a significant contribution to Zambian exports. Nevertheless, diversification was still partly based on the mining sector, for gold and nickel accounted for 17% of total exports.³⁰

Guinea-Bissau and Ethiopia, two countries with largely untapped mineral resources, showed a substantial structural inflexibility in the sphere of agricultural exports. During a period of 15 years, cashew nuts consistently ranked first among Guinea-Bissau’s export goods, and their percentage actually increased from 41-44% in 1988-1989 to over 80% in 1992-2001. In contrast, the percentage of groundnuts, fish, and shrimps gradually decreased from a combined total of 46% in 1988-1989 to 2% in 2001, and industrial exports were conspicuous by their absence. That is, the export profile of Guinea-Bissau became less, rather than more, diversified during the period under examination. As Steven Kyle noted, “the degree of [Guinea-Bissau’s] export dependence on this crop exceeds even the export dependence of most members of OPEC on oil exports.”³¹ Thus the impressive growth of Guinea-Bissau’s per capita GDP seems to have resulted primarily from the cashew boom. In Ethiopia, coffee consistently ranked first among the country’s export goods, and from 1987 to 2000, its share invariably exceeded 55%. It occurred only in 2001-2003 that Ethiopia’s dependence on coffee started to decrease. Similarly, hides and skins remained a major component of Ethiopian exports during the period under examination, but a shift toward leather products (i.e., toward a higher level of processing) did not appear yet in the period under examination.³² From 1992 on, legumes and oilseeds made a somewhat fluctuating contribution to Ethiopian exports, but their share did not match the significance of qat exports.

Tanzania and Mozambique, two countries that initially relied mainly on agriculture but later developed their mineral sectors, proved more able to diversify their export profile than the six countries described above. Tanzania’s initial dependence on coffee and cotton exports gradually decreased, from a total of 53-57% in 1987-1988 to a level of 6.5-21% in 2000-2003. The declining significance of these goods was combined with the contribution that other agricultural products (cashew nuts, tea, and tobacco) made to Tanzanian exports, but a more important factor was the dynamic growth of mineral exports. The combined share of gold and diamond exports increased from 7% in 1996 to 42.5% in 2003. Uniquely among the selected African countries, Tanzania also proved able to export manufactured goods (mainly textiles and semi-processed food products), at least in limited quantities (15-19.4% in 1989-1998). Later, however, industrial exports were overshadowed by the spectacular emergence of mineral exports.³³ From this perspective, the growth of mineral exports was not simply a process of diversification but also a process that potentially reduced diversity. Mozambique’s initially high dependence on shrimp and cashew nut exports (a total of 69.5% in 1987-1988) gradually decreased, though in 2001, the combined total of these goods still stood at 47%. Diversification was achieved partly by the fluctuating contribution of cotton, sugar, copra, and fruit exports, but the greatest change occurred in 2000-2003, in the form of electricity and aluminum exports. The rise of electricity exports resulted from the fact that the massive Cahora-Bassa hydroelectric transmission system, built in 1969-1979 but out of service during the Mozambican Civil War (1977-1992), finally started to operate in 1997. In 2003, aluminum suddenly became the country’s most important export product, with a share exceeding one-half of total exports. Notably, Mozambique’s aluminum smelting industry used alumina imported from Australia, and thus it did not constitute such a case of resource dependency as Guinea’s alumina industry (which was based on the country’s own bauxite reserves).³⁴ The creation of such an import-dependent aluminum industry was rendered possible by the availability of cheap electricity in Mozambique (a situation that stood in a sharp contrast with Guinea’s serious power supply constraints). Still, Mozambique’s aluminum exports were composed almost exclusively of unwrought aluminum, that is, a product that underwent only a simple form of procession.

23 “World Bank Data. Indicators. Urban population (% of total), 1985-1989.” Accessed at: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS ; “World Bank Data. Indicators. GDP per capita (current US$), 1985-1989.” Accessed at http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?page=5 ; “World Bank Data. Indicators. Exports of goods and services (% of GDP), 1985-1989.” Accessed at http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.EXP.GNFS.ZS?page=5 .
24 The yearbooks cited in Table 4 were accessed at the United Nations International Merchandise Trade Statistics website:
25 “Mozambique 2008,” p. 1. Accessed at the United Nations International Merchandise Trade Statistics website: http://comtrade.un.org/pb/first.aspx. See also Thomas R. Yager, “The Mineral Industry of Mozambique,” in U.S. Geological Survey Minerals Yearbook 2010, p. 31.1. Accessed at: http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/country/2012/myb3-2012-mz
26 “Congo 2011,” pp. 1-2. Accessed at the United Nations International Merchandise Trade Statistics website: http://comtrade.un.org/pb/first.aspx . See also John Frank Clark and Samuel Decalo, Historical Dictionary of Republic of the Congo. 4th edition (Lanham, MY: Scarecrow Press, Inc., 2012), pp. 216-217.
27 “Vietnam 2008,” p. 1. Accessed at the United Nations International Merchandise Trade Statistics website: http://comtrade.un.org/pb/first.aspx . For an overview of Vietnamese textile and garment exports, see also M. Zakir Hossein, “Report on Vietnam Textile & Garment Industry” (Nairobi: African Cotton & Textile Industries Federation, 2010), pp. 21-23.
28 On the problem of resource dependency in Angola and Congo-Brazzaville, see Alves da Rocha, Regina Santos, Luís Bonfim, Francisco Miguel Paulo, Ivar Kolstad and Arne Wiig, “Diversification of the Angolan Economy” (Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute, 2014), pp. 1-4; Pierre Englebert and James Ron, “Primary Commodities and War: Congo-Brazzaville's Ambivalent Resource Curse,” Comparative Politics, Vol. 37, Issue 1 (October 2004), pp. 69-70.
29 Jean Le Dem, Chris Geiregat, Michael Gorbanyov, and Mahvash Qureshi, “Guinea: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix.” IMF Country Report No. 08/20 (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 2008), p. 3.
30 On the problem of resource dependency in Zambia, see Mark Ingle, “Unbalanced growth and dependency theory in Zambia: A post-independence survey,” African Journal of Business Management, Vol. 6, Issue 16 (April 2012), pp. 5467-5471.
31 Steven Kyle, “Cashew Production in Guinea Bissau.” Working Paper 2009-25 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, Department of Applied Economics and Management, 2009), p. 2.
32 On the post-2004 growth of Ethiopia’s leather industry, see Deborah Brautigam, Margaret McMillan, and Xiaoyang Tang, "The Role of Foreign Investment in Ethiopia’s Leather Value Chain.” PEDL Research Note – ERG Project 106
(London: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 2013).
33 On the recent emergence of Tanzania’s mining sector, see Deborah Fahy Bryceson, Jesper Bosse Jønsson, Crispin Kinabo, and Mike Shand, “Unearthing treasure and trouble: mining as an impetus to urbanisation in Tanzania,” Journal of Contemporary African Studies, Vol. 30, Issue 4 (2012), pp. 631-649.
34 Yager, “The Mineral Industry of Mozambique,” p. 31-1.

This article was originally published on archives.kdischool.ac.kr
Changyong Choi is a professor of international development and public policy at the K.D.I. School of Public Policy and Management. His research interests include development assistance, governance reform, and international development cooperation for North Korean economic development. Working as an advisory director at the Center for International Development in K.D.I., he established the Knowledge Sharing Program's planning, managing, and evaluation system. As a professor, he has taught institutional reform in developing countries and governance in international development cooperation. He received his Ph.D. in Social Science (Public Policy concentration) in the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs of Syracuse University.
Balazs Szalontai is focused on the Cold War as well as the domestic and foreign policies of Communist regimes, with particular respect to North Korea, Vietnam, Mongolia, and Albania.

He joined IZA as a Research Fellow in April 2007.

Governance

Governance to African countries is like oxygen to humans. It is crucial to the prospects of African countries achieving economic prosperity without disintegrating into civil conflict. It is the ability of political leaders to create the enabling factors that will facilitate maximization of the competitive advantage of every country, no matter the size or the amount of resource endowments. Better, more competent governance structures and environment is the missing element that African nations need to unleash the potential of their people and country. We will discuss it frequently in this segment of the newsletter.

Is Accountable Governance a Solution to African Problems?
By Dan Kuwali


Introduction

It is no longer news that governance dysfunctions at national and international levels are the major culprits responsible for conflict, instability, and poor socio-economic development in Africa. Ethical shortfalls and accountability deficits in Africa’s governance system have long been a challenge for both the private and public sector performance.

Among the seven key aspirations listed in Africa Agenda 2063a: The Africa We Want, one theme stands out as the key to Africa’s political and economic transformation. That is “an Africa of good governance, democracy, respect for human rights, justice and the rule of law.” Even the former United Nations (UN) Secretary-General, Ghana’s Kofi Annan, advised that “[g]ood governance  is perhaps the single most important factor in eradicating poverty and promoting development.”

Thus, it is safe to assert that accountable governance is part of the solutions  to most of Africa’s problems. The theory is easy to understand. Eradicating poverty and improving human development in Africa must begin with creation of wealth for inclusive growth, a process that requires a robust entrepreneurial class. To achieve these goals, there must be peace and security. Unfortunately, weak and dysfunctional governance structures continue to prevent many African countries from creating and sustaining the necessary enabling environment for peaceful coexistence, entrepreneurship, and wealth creation.

What is The Problem With Governance on the Continent?

For many, politics in Africa is a realm that attracts courageous crooks  and scares away cowardly saints. Unless ethical leadership and accountable governance become prerequisites for holding public office, African nations will continue to be at the mercy of elected officials who assume office to feed their greed and line their pockets. Africa is facing perennial challenges such as intra-state conflict, terrorism, and unconstitutional changes of government, among others. Governance issues are often at the heart of these perennial problems. Many African states are also facing difficult questions to uphold accountable governance and ethical leadership.

The degree of adherence to, and extent of compliance with, accountable governance and respect for  the rule of law in Africa differs from country to country. According to the 2021  World Justice Project Rule of Law Index, which ranked 139 countries, the highly  ranked country in Africa is Rwanda on position  42 whereas the lowest is the Democratic Republic of the Congo on position  137. In North Africa, Tunisia is ranked the highest while Egypt is the lowest at position 136. Most countries in Africa are in the top 48 percent category indicating progress towards commitment to accountable governance on the African continent despite retrogressive events reversing the trajectory of constitutionalism on the continent. The recent Ibrahim Index of African Governance show progress in constitutionalism in countries such as Malawi and Senegal. The recent rise in unconstitutional changes of government has overshadowed successful transfers of power in many progressive countries that uphold constitutionalism. For example, most countries in Southern Africa have upheld constitutionalism and respect of the rule of law save for Lesotho, where there has been political instability, and Eswatini, which is the only remaining absolute monarchy in the region. Likewise, East Africa hosts several stable democracies, especially Tanzania and Kenya, which has just held a peaceful election and, so far, envisaging a peaceful transfer of power. West Africa is home to largest democracies on the continent such as Ghana, Nigeria, and Senegal.

While there cannot be a one-size-fits-all explanation for the proliferation of coups , the causal factors include illiteracy and poverty, especially for vulnerable and marginalised populations, insecurity, poor governance, including endemic corruption and economic mismanagement, infrastructural deficit, poor socio-economic systems and institutions, and frustrated youths.  Africa has seen a renewed quest for accountable governance expressed itself in the streets, popular culture, the Internet, and social media. These youth-led popular protests have demonstrated against social injustice, fraudulent elections, corruption, insecurity, demanding inclusion to participate in governance and a life of dignity as equal citizens. Socio-economic conditions have produced public outrage. Many countries today still face difficult governance questions such as how can governments counter terrorism and cybercrimes without infringing the right to privacy of individuals? How can security agencies strike a balance between confidentiality or secrecy and the citizens’ right of access to information? How can we ensure parliamentary oversight of defence and security organs in view of lack of technical capacity of parliamentarians in this specialized sector?

Why Accountable Governance is Key to Africa’s Rise

Accountable governance is central to the achievement of all the 17 United Nations Sustainable Development Goals  (SDGs). This is particularly clear in Goal 16, which requires States to “[p]romote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable, and inclusive institutions at all levels. For example, in the context of the African Continental Free Trade Area  (ACFTA), Africa cannot have free trade that creates wealth without governance systems that ensure that all trade within and across the continent is fair.

Countries  cannot create jobs that make people self-reliant without governance mechanisms that protect workers from exploitation. States cannot achieve food security without holding cartels that pervert the marketplace accountable to protect farmers. Public office-bearers may ignore their constitutional obligations at their peril where accountability and the rule of law constitute the sharp and mighty sword against impunity. States cannot defeat institutional corruption without independent and impartial oversight mechanisms where public officers are held accountable. Therefore, accountable governance coupled with ethical leadership are the foundations to achieve the Africa We Want.

What is Accountable Governance?

Accountable governance entails respect for the rule of law where the exercise of authority is subject to accountability, just law, open government, and accessible and impartial justice.  is built on a foundation of rule of law particularly accountability and transparency; combating corruption, empowered civil societies including citizen participation in governance, an enabling legal and judicial framework, and an efficient private sector. Accountable governance promotes transparency, respect for the rule of law including equality under the law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and promoting public trust.

Accountable Governance is an enabler for socio-economic development in Africa. From an economic perspective, accountable governance is what creates an enabling environment for economic efficiency through equitable rules that promote fair and well-functioning markets, curtail corruption, and ensure the fair delivery of public services. From a social standpoint, accountable governance is what prevents the marginalization of vulnerable social groups by the rich, the powerful, and the well-connected thereby promoting peace. From a development angle, accountable governance is what ensures the equitable distribution of infrastructural developments and provision of welfare programmes. The key challenge then is how to attain accountable governance accompanied by ethical leadership on the continent.

Now, What Should African Countries Do?

The picture that is emerging from this discussion is that the key to achieve peace, security and development in Africa is accountable governance, which entails responsible leadership, participatory citizenship, free, fair, and just political representation. Accountable has the attendant attributes to improving socioeconomic well-being of the population in terms of quality education, affordable health care, job creation, financial security, food security, and an effective criminal justice system that fights corruption and impunity. In the spirit of African Solutions to African Problems, African states should resolve some of the ethical and governance issues stalling peace and clogging the wheels of growth and development on the continent. This discussion suggests four people-centred approaches to achieve accountable governance in Africa.

First, countries should entrench mechanisms that promote constitutionalism, accountability, democracy, and accountable governance. Accountable governance can only be guaranteed by strong public institutions that uphold the rule of law, operate within a human rights framework, and require public duty-bearers to be transparent and accountable. To perform its oversight role, the judiciary should be independent and impartial.

Secondly, a critical imperative to achieve accountable governance is empowerment of citizens. To this end, African countries should develop and implement education programmes that help citizens to not only understand and appreciate national constitutions but also recognise the law as a tool that they can use to organize their private lives and resolve their conflicts, at personal and societal levels. This need for legal and constitutional education is particularly urgent among marginalized groups such as youth and women. They too need to be empowered with the information, whether it be on such topics as security, rights, terrorism, intra-state conflicts, trade laws, unconstitutional changes of government, or laws that regulate our economy, our agriculture, our mining, our media, our elections, and our domestic relationships.

Third, ethical leadership is a precursor to accountable governance. Ethical leadership is characterized by a strong social contract between the society and the state, that is sufficiently inclusive to permit management of diversity and plurality of views. Ethical leadership is a potent force to propel the body politic to focus on ethical values that serve as a model for the rest of society. Thus, ethical leadership is critical to inculcate a culture of constitutionalism and the rule of law in Africa, where the law is the basis for political decision-making and administrative action.

Fourth, more states should subject themselves to the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) to achieve a critical mass of accountable governance on the continent. As a component of the New Partnership For Africa’s Development  (NEPAD), the APRM is a voluntary mechanism designed to promote structural conflict prevention through good governance. Given the nature of the peace and security on the continent, the APSA cannot work in isolation, it must consistently and coherently coordinate with human rights institutions and organs meant to promote peace, security, and socioeconomic well-being of individuals on the continent.

Accountable governance is key for an _Africa where there is political stability,  deepened democracy , equity, and justice, and economic prosperity. To achieve this, there must always be a strong social contract between society and the State. On their part, African leaders should redefine their politics to focus not on power but commit to accountability, respect for the rule of law and ethical values that make leadership a people-centred enterprise.


This article was originally published on rwi.lu.se
Dan Kuwali is an Affiliated Professor at the Raoul Wallenberg Institute of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, Lund University. He serves in the Malawi Defence Force as Chief of Legal Services and Judge Advocate General.

Prof Kuwali’s work and research interests span a spectrum of issues ranging from global security, policy, and strategy to International Law and International Relations including International Criminal Law, Human Rights and Humanitarian Law.

His publications include: The Palgrave Handbook of Sustainable Peace and Security in Africa(2022); Forceful Intervention for Protection of Human Rights in Africa – International Law – Oxford Bibliographies (2020; By All Means Necessary: Protecting Civilians and Preventing Atrocities in Africa (2017);  Africa and the Responsibility to Protect: Article 4(h) of the African Union (2016); and scores of  other peer-reviewed  monographs, book chapters, and articles.

Prof Kuwali’s is also an Extraordinary Professor of International Law at the Centre for Human Rights, University of Pretoria, South Africa; and President of the Governing Council of the African Military Law Forum. He is Adjunct Professor and Founding Executive Director, Centre of Strategic Studies, Malawi University of Science and Technology, and Fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government, and at the U.S. Army War College, Pennsylvania.
 

Unleashed: A New Paradigm of African Trade with the World is now available to buy at any of the sites listed below. 

Unleashed Site | Bookmasters | Amazon.com

African Trade Group’s Infrastructure Project for African Countries

 
African Trade Group has designed a project that addresses internal roads, which is one of the most important infrastructure challenges facing African countries, with a very innovative infrastructure plan.

Highlights of the plan:
  • It is a private sector-driven initiative. It will involve the private and public sector in every participating African country.

  • The funding for the project is through private capital markets and will be led by one of the world’s preeminent financial services firms. They will partner with financial services companies in every African country in market making and deal structuring.

  • The payment for the project is designed around the resources capabilities of African countries using conventional and unconventional means.

  • Indigenous African contractors will sort out and be invited to supply construction services in each country in order to contribute to the process of building long-term capacity within a country.

  • African labor will make up a minimum of 50% of the jobs that emanate from the project in each country.

  • The project manager will be a renowned world-class civil engineering company. They will partner with other firms of renown and qualification.

We encourage our African readers who are in high office to contact us for additional information. Also follow the link to read additional details about the plan.

African Trade Group

Our Mandate

To deliver Africa to the world and the world to Africa. 

Our main focus is on African trade. We specialize in helping clients in African countries to develop industrial projects. We will broker commodities and manufactured goods to and from the global market to African countries. In the area of industrial exports, we will help our clients to develop export oriented industries and market the goods produced in hard currency markets.

Our Vision

Our goal is to be a key component of the transition of African countries from raw materials exports to industrial goods export. In addition to contributing to the rise of export industries in every African country, African Trade Group aspires to become the premier company in the trading of commodities and manufactured goods of African origin.

Contact Us

John I. Akhile Sr
Publisher
www.unleashafricantrade.com
Facebook
Twitter
YouTube
LinkedIn
Website
view this email in your browser
Copyright © 2024 Unleash African Trade, All rights reserved.


Want to change how you receive these emails?
You can update your preferences or unsubscribe from this list.

Email Marketing Powered by Mailchimp